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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
By any measure, metropolitan Atlanta is a success story.  Rising from the ashes of the Civil War, the city
and its region have become one of the nation's largest metropolitan areas.  Between 1970 and 1996,
metropolitan Atlanta was the nation's second fastest growing major metropolitan area in population
(behind Phoenix) and in rising income (behind Boston).  By 2020, the metropolitan area will exceed five
million people while its commuting shed will be home to nearly seven million people.
Despite this enviable track record, all is not rosy.  Atlantans drive more and pollute more per capita than
any other people in the nation.  Its air quality has become among the nation's worst.  The federal
government has cut metropolitan Atlanta from certain highway funds.  Many of Atlanta's freeway links
rank among the nation's most congested.  Rivers are polluted and over-silted.  Farmland is lost at a rate
of 50 acres a day and total open space at more than 100 acres a day.  New schools open just as those
already paid for close.  Many communities have become so exclusive through their land use planning that
school teachers, fire fighters, and police officers cannot afford to live in them.  In short, Atlanta's heralded
quality of life is eroding.
Atlantans have demonstrated a remarkable capacity to meet new challenges.  Through savvy leadership,
Atlanta had the foresight to build what has become the nation's busiest airport, clearly propelling the
metropolitan area into world class status.  Where other areas struggled with race relations, Atlantans faced
up to the challenge and in many (albeit not all) ways overcame barriers.  Despite its last minute bid, metro
Atlantans landed what will likely remain the world's biggest Olympics, ever.  Compared to challenges of
the past, addressing current challenges should be child's-play; all that is needed is a way in which to engage
in collaborative decision-making at the regional level.
Can something be done?  Georgia's Constitution is one of the nation's most flexible.  It provides the
legislature and the Governor with numerous ways in which to: create a decision-making body to address
one or more public policy issues; define its regions whether one county or several; compose it through
appointment by local officials, the governor, or the public through elections; prescribe its powers
including taxing powers; give local governments a reason to be meaningful stakeholders in regional
decision-making; and provide a wide range of financial and permitting incentives and disincentives to do
the right thing.
This report provides the policy and constitutional foundation for crafting regional decision-making
approaches to meet regional challenges in a way that simultaneously sustains economic development and
improves the quality of life.
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vOVERVIEW
Who loses if nothing is done?  The city of Atlanta, with its central location, mature transit network, excess capacity in utilities,
and reasonably aggressive public officials will probably thrive no matter what happens outside the I-285 perimeter.  Communities
outside the boundaries of the ten-county Atlanta Regional Commission (ARC) area will enjoy the temporary fruits of being the
next ring of new suburban development.  Caught between the Atlanta magnet and the sprawling communities outside the ARC,
ARC's suburban communities may bear the worst of the downside effects of the current regional decision-making structure.  In
the end, though, it is all of North Georgia that loses as congestion, pollution, rising taxes, and reduced quality of life diminish
its attractiveness to economic development.
Between 1970 and 1996, metropolitan Atlanta was the nation's second fastest growing major metropolitan
area (behind Phoenix) and second in rising income (after Boston).  Its growth will continue.  By 2020:
< The 10-county Atlanta Regional Commission area will exceed four million people.
< The 20-county Atlanta metropolitan statistical area will exceed five million people.
< The 59-county Atlanta metropolitan commuting shed will approach seven million people.
As the population grows, so, too does the concern about the quality of life in the region.  Consider:
< At 34 miles per day per person, metro Atlantans drive longer distances and produce more
tons of air pollution per capita than any other metro area in the nation.  Los Angeles
looks good by comparison.
< Homes are so far away from jobs, shopping, friends, and relatives that metro Atlantans
spend the most amount of time in cars in the nation.  Yet, many jobs go begging because
they are simply too far away from people who need them.
< Declining air quality is driving people and businesses away; people with respiratory
ailments are advised by their doctors to leave and companies such as Harley Davidson
decide to locate elsewhere because of fears about limited ability to expand assembly.
< Around the bend there will be restrictions on water because of the "water wars." Alabama
and Florida seem to want their share of water that passes through Georgia.  They might
have a point:  Metro Atlantans consume 50 percent more water per capita than is
assumed customarily based on planning standards.
< Open spaces are being lost at a rate of more than 100 acres per day.  The result is less
vegetation with which to help cleanse the air.  It also means increased damage from
flooding, not to mention loss of food production and scenery.
< Infrastructure is being overbuilt because development is moving away from where
infrastructure already exists.  Schools already bought and paid for in one part of the
region close while new ones are built in another.  The 10-county region comprising the
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Atlanta Regional Commission (ARC) appears to have enough water to serve about 4.5
million people and sewer capacity to serve about 6.5 million people, yet it is possible that
over the next generation most of the growth in North Georgia will occur outside the
ARC leaving existing facilities underused.
Regional problems require regional solutions.  What should be done?  First, there needs to be consensus
that certain problems can be addressed only through some effective form of decision-making coordinated
on a regional basis.  There appears to be consensus that at least the following issues rise to that level:
< Transportation because of growing congestion, decreasing accessibility throughout the
metropolitan area, and air pollution.
< Air pollution because of federal sanctions and eroding public satisfaction with Atlanta's
quality of life.
< Water quality and quantity because of impending restrictions associated with the multi-
state "water wars."
To some extent, these challenges overlap.  Air quality is affected in large part by traffic, which is a by-
product of highway construction that chases rather than shapes development, which in turn consumes
more land and leads to more water consumption and water pollution.  Addressing these challenges
necessarily requires addressing other issues reviewed in this report, namely:
< Improving the jobs-housing balance because it will reduce commuting distances and thus
improve air quality.
< Reducing fiscal disparity among communities because disparity forces less-endowed
communities to expand their property tax base regardless of regional impacts.
< Preserving open spaces because that helps cleanse the air, reduce the potential for
groundwater pollution from septic systems used by more than one million people
presently, and reduce the potential for low density urban sprawl that undermines
transportation and air pollution control efforts.
Further challenging regional decision-making efforts is that each issue has its own "region." 
< The air quality "region" includes a 13-county "nonattainment" area but it could just as
easily include the 20 county metropolitan statistical area and more likely the 43 county
airshed composing most of North Georgia.
< The water quality and quantity "region" may very well be those counties in Georgia
through which the "water wars" rivers run (Chattahoochee, Flint, Coosa, and Tallapoosa);
50-plus counties extending from the North Georgia mountains to the Florida border.
< The transportation "region" is the commuting shed of the greater metropolitan area
composed of the 59 Georgia counties of the Bureau of Economic Analysis's economic
area for Atlanta.
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Each of those regions is larger than the ARC.  If an issue is addressed by a decision-making body that
does not cover its true area, the issue will not be adequately addressed and perverse outcomes could arise.
For example, if efforts to manage transportation and improve air quality are limited just to the ARC area,
development could be shifted farther out, making the transportation and air quality problems worse.
What are the models of regional decision-making that may effectively address regional issues?
Single-purpose mechanisms recognize that every problem or need for service has its own unique
characteristics for optimal performance.  One form of this approach are special districts.  The
ARC area has 44 special districts while Atlanta's commuting shed has 148. Local examples include:
< Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority serving DeKalb and Fulton counties.
< Grady Hospital Authority serving DeKalb and Fulton counties.
< School districts that serve mostly entire counties with some exceptions (such as Atlanta
and Marietta).
< County water and wastewater authorities.
Another form is contracting among local governments. For example, the city of Atlanta and
Fulton County contract for wastewater treatment with cities and counties throughout the region.
Privatization of some services with local government oversight is also a form of contracting.
Asset sharing involves some local governments sharing in the cost of providing a service that
everyone uses, such as MARTA.  Mutual aid agreements are common in public safety.
Multi-purpose mechanisms recognized that in large metropolitan areas, so many services overlap
and service delivery can be so complex that coordinating them is important to improve efficiency.
This can be done in a variety of ways.  Regional (multicounty) government is a regional decision-
making structure in which a single unified government serves an entire metropolitan region.
Regional two-tier federations such as in Toronto, are a decision-making structure in which an
upper-tier regional entity provides areawide functions and autonomous lower-tier local
governments provide local functions. Regional multipurpose districts are decision-making systems
in which an elected or appointed entity provides or coordinates two or more services throughout
the region while autonomous local governments (counties, municipalities, townships, special-
purpose governments) deliver other services to the area.  Examples are  the Portland (Oregon)
Metropolitan Services District and the Minneapolis-St. Paul Twin Cities Metropolitan Council.
City-county consolidation  involves a central city and sometimes other municipal governments
merging with the surrounding county to form a single government unit such as occurred in
Athens/Clarke County, Georgia.
Which is best for metropolitan Atlanta?  A single-purpose arrangement to address transportation, or a
multi-purpose arrangement to address transportation, water, wastewater, stormwater, regional recreation,
and other functions of regional significance?  
Who will champion a regional decision-making effort?  Experience shows that locally elected officials will
not only eschew leadership but will fight it because they fear losing the ability to serve constituents’
interests.  Business leaders, legislators, and the governor hold the key. 
Is the state constitution helpful?  In a word, yes.  In fact, Georgia's constitution is among the most flexible
in the nation in enabling the legislature to address regional problems.   Article III, Section VI, Paragraph
VI provides:
Special districts.  As hereinafter provided in this Paragraph, special districts may be created for
the provision of local government services within such districts; and fees, assessments, and taxes
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may be levied and collected within such districts to pay, wholly or partially, the cost of providing
such services therein and to construct and maintain facilities therefor.  Such special districts may
be created and fees, assessments, or taxes may be levied and collected therein by any one or more
of the following methods:
(a)  By general law which directly creates the districts.
(b) By general law which requires the creation of districts under conditions specified
by such general law.
(c)  By municipal or county ordinance or resolution, except that no such ordinance
or resolution may supersede a law enacted by the General Assembly pursuant to
subparagraphs (a) or (b) of this Paragraph.
The term special districts is not apparently limited to just municipal or county boundaries and would seem
to include multiple counties and municipalities within them, nor is it apparently limited to the provision
of a single service.  The term local government services can include police and fire, solid waste, public health,
streets and roads, parks and recreation, stormwater and wastewater, water, public housing, public transit,
libraries, dock and port facilities, building codes, air quality control, and even pension systems as provided
by the constitution.  The term methods of empowerment can include outright formation by general law, or
membership by local governments meeting certain criteria, such as being within an air quality
nonattainment area. Membership can be construed as voluntary through action of local ordinance or
resolution with the incentive given to voluntary membership being continuation of state grants.
Local governments’ decisions are based mostly on self interest.  When choosing between alternatives that
would leave the local community better off but the region as a whole worse off, the decision will usually
be that which advances self-interest even if it impacts adversely on nearby communities.  One way to
assure that decisions in local self-interest reflect regional concerns is to provide financial and permitting
incentives to local governments that consider regional concerns.  The constitutional basis for crafting
financial incentives is found in Article VII, Section III, Paragraph III:
Gran ts  to  c o u n t ie s  an d  m u n ic ip a lit ie s .  State funds may be granted to counties and municipalities within the state.
The grants authorized by this Paragraph shall be made in such manner and form and subject to the procedures and conditions
specified by law.
The constitution provides additional basis for crafting regulatory incentives including conditions for
permitting certain activities is found in Article IX, Section II, Paragraph III(c):
Nothing contained within this Paragraph shall operate to prohibit the General Assembly from enacting general laws relative
to the subject matters listed in subparagraph (a) of the Paragraph (relating to police and fire protection, garbage and waste
disposal and disposal, public health facilities, street and road and related facilities, parks and recreation facilities, storm water
facilities, water facilities, public housing, 
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public transportation facilities, libraries and related facilities, terminal and dock and related facilities, building codes, and air
quality control measures) or to prohibit the General Assembly by general law from regulating, restricting, or limiting the exercise
of powers listed therein.
Conceivably, everything local government does affecting development may be regulated by the General
Assembly.  Thus, water effluent permits, the authority to issue septic system permits, and a variety of
other permitting exercises by local government could be incentives given to local governments for
becoming members of multi-purpose, multi-jurisdictional special districts.  How does this relate to "home
rule" provisions of the constitution?  It would appear that local governments may be free to act in their
self interest but the legislature is also free to regulate the manner of action.  The Georgia General
Assembly appears indeed to enjoy considerable flexibility in crafting state-level approaches to addressing
regional issues.
Policy Considerations
The question thus falls onto the legislature and the governor.  Business leaders and interest groups that
have regional orientations may also encourage regional decision-making approaches.  Public opinion polls
commissioned in 1998 by the Atlanta Journal-Constitution newspaper show that a majority of
metropolitan Atlantans believe that certain issues are addressed best at the regional level.  If the current
structure for regional decision-making is to be crafted, a few considerations must be addressed such as:
< What are the issues to be within its jurisdiction?  Would it be just transportation or water
and air quality, or water and wastewater systems?
< What is the region of each issue?  Is it the 10-county ARC, or the larger Census-defined
20-county metropolitan area, or the 40-60 county commuting shed?
< How shall a decision-making body be composed?  Will it be appointed by local officials
(as ARC is), or appointed by the governor (such as the Twin Cities Metropolitan Council),
or elected (like metropolitan Portland)?
< What powers will it have?  
< How can local governments become stakeholders in regional decision-making?
< Who backs it up legally, financially, and through permitting authority?
Who loses if nothing is done?  The city of Atlanta, with its central location, mature transit network, excess
capacity in utilities, and reasonably aggressive public officials will probably thrive no matter what happens
outside the I-285 perimeter.  Communities outside the boundaries of the ten-county Atlanta Regional
Commission (ARC) area will enjoy the temporary fruits of being the next ring of new suburban
development.  Caught between the Atlanta magnet and the sprawling communities outside the ARC,
ARC's suburban communities may bear the worst of the downside effects of the current regional
decision-making structure.  In the end, though, it is all of North Georgia that loses as congestion,
pollution, rising taxes, and reduced quality of life diminish its attractiveness to economic development.
x... metropolitan Atlanta is
one of the nation's 
greatest success stories.  
INTRODUCTION
W hat do London, Chicago, Moscow, and Atlanta have in common?  They all burned to the groundbut were reborn to become greater than before.  By nearly every objective measure, metropolitan
Atlanta is one of the nation's greatest success stories.  Beginning as a town that could not decide
on its own name (Marthasville and Terminus were its first names), it was burned to the ground during the
Civil War just when it seemed to have found itself.  In the more than 130 years since, Atlanta has grown
from dust to a metropolitan area that is easily recognizable throughout the world.  This is no accident.
The culture of Atlanta is decidedly pro-growth.  Where the old money in cities of the North and much
of the West seem protective of their station, Atlanta's leadership has always seemed to exclaim, "Y'all
come down."  Witness only the rapidity with which newcomers are welcomed and can become an integral
part of the fabric of this dynamic community.
The newcomer sees a vibrant metropolitan area composed
of about four million apparently very busy souls.  To many
it seems incredible that at the mid point of this century,
Atlanta and Birmingham were nearly the same size.  In the
half century since, Atlanta has blossomed into the dominant
city of the Southeast.  By 2020, the area covered by the
Atlanta Regional Commission (ARC) will grow to 4.2 million
people while the Atlanta metropolitan statistical area (MSA) will exceed 5 million and its "commuting
shed" will approach 7 million.  Since 1970, the Atlanta MSA has surpassed Baltimore, Cleveland, Miami,
Minneapolis-St. Paul, Pittsburgh, and St. Louis in population.  By 2020 it will surpass Boston and Detroit
on the way to becoming to the nation's ninth largest MSA.1
However, all is not rosy,  as this report will detail.  Atlantans drive more than any other people in the
nation.   Its air quality has become among the nation's worst.   Many of Atlanta's freeway links rank2 3
among the nation's most congested.   Rivers are polluted and over-silted.   Farmland is being lost at a pace4 5
of 50 acres each day  and total open space at more than 100 acres each day.  As schools that have already6 7
been paid for close, new ones with new debt amounting to hundreds of millions of dollars are being built.
The federal government, citing insufficient planning to bring the region into conformity with federal air
quality standards, has cut off the Atlanta region from certain highway funds.   Recommendations by8
regional planners to local governments on issues of development go unheeded.  Local governments do
what they please because they do not suffer the consequences of their actions that affect others in the
region.
Will success destroy Atlanta?  Or will its people and their leaders come together to solve problems that
affect everyone in the region so that growth is sustained?  That is the central question guiding this report.
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BACKGROUND
A s Wayne Hill, Chairman of both the Gwinnett County Board of Commissioners and the AtlantaRegional Commission puts it, we are all here because Atlanta (the region) has been good to us.9
We enjoy a favorable climate, attractive neighborhoods, reasonably efficient local governments
with acceptable tax burdens, easy access, and pride in being in a place that is recognized world-wide.
Incomes are rising, jobs are forming at a fast pace, and we can buy a mansion here for the same price
people may pay for a hovel elsewhere.  In short, the vast majority of us enjoy the good life.  Astute,
elected officials understand this and work to sustain it.  The question is, how can our success be sustained
given pressing challenges?   But first, let us look at Atlanta's growth in relation to other metropolitan
areas.
RESURGENS
Atlanta is the quintessential growth machine.  Business, labor, education, political, African-American, and
civic leaders seem of one mind when it comes to attracting growth.  Business and labor leaders naturally
desire growth for the increases in income, wages, and jobs it represents.  Education leaders desire growth
for the infusion of talent, ideas, and resources it represents.  Political leaders desire growth for the
improvement in the standard of living and quality of life it promises, not to mention more revenues with
which to advance popular programs.  African-American leaders would seem to desire growth for the
opportunities it creates for historically disenfranchised Americans.  Civic leaders seem to desire growth
for its ability to elevate the social and cultural stature of the area.  All groups tend to work together to
facilitate growth, mostly with little regard to the costs of growth.  Growth is such a part of the culture
here that any idea even remotely affecting the growth machine status quo is to challenge its raison d'être.10
The regional landscape is also an element of this growth machine.  The region is relatively flat to gently
rolling and there are no major physical barriers to growth such as mountains or oceans.  Although there
are important farming areas within the region, the quality of land for farming is decidedly lower than that
found in the northeast outside of Philadelphia, or in Florida's central landscape, or California's central
valley, or Oregon's Willamette Valley.  Impounded water is sufficient to accommodate the needs of
millions of people while groundwater can accommodate yet more.  Even the weather cooperates.
In short, it may seem that if there was ever a place in the United States for an area to grow, it is the
Atlanta area.  Between 1970 and 1996, the Atlanta MSA was the nation's second fastest growing large
(over two million) metropolitan area in rate of growth, behind Phoenix (see Table 1).  With growth has
come rising incomes (table 2).  During the same period, income in the Atlanta MSA rose at the second
fastest pace among the largest MSAs, second only to Boston.
New jobs, rising incomes, emergence as a metropolitan area recognized around the world, Atlanta
Resurgens is a study in success.
Will this success continue?  Probably.  Despite storm clouds on the horizon, the sheer momentum of
development will mean that the Atlanta region will continue to grow.  Table 3 posits that growth based
on three regional landscapes: the ARC region, the Atlanta MSA, and the Atlanta economic area.  The
figures show that most of the region's growth is projected to occur within the ARC area,
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Table 1
POPULATION CHANGE AMONG LARGEST METROPOLITAN AREAS
1970 - 1996
Rank Metropolitan Area
Population
Change % Change
1970 1996
1 Phoenix 1,049,680 2,753,043 1,703,363 162.27%
2 Atlanta 1,772,991 3,531,203 1,758,212 99.17%
3 Tampa-St. Pete 1,117,227 2,198,898 1,081,671 96.82%
4 San Diego 1,365,976 2,677,203 1,311,227 95.99%
5 Houston 2,193,261 4,239,927 2,046,666 93.32%
6 Dallas-Ft. Worth 2,438,346 4,565,324 2,126,978 87.23%
7 Miami 1,902,815 3,478,051 1,575,236 82.78%
8 Denver 1,336,088 2,271,732 935,644 70.03%
9 Portland 1,266,836 2,072,805 805,969 63.62%
10 Seattle 2,041,221 3,309,180 1,267,959 62.12%
11 Los Angeles 10,000,090 15,426,907 5,426,817 54.27%
12 San Francisco 4,763,476 6,616,009 1,852,533 38.89%
13 Minneapolis-St. Paul 2,031,513 2,760,404 728,891 35.88%
14 Washington 5,412,863 7,145,947 1,733,084 32.02%
15 Baltimore 2,094,838 2,468,790 373,952 17.85%
16 Boston 5,239,273 5,788,380 549,107 10.48%
17 Chicago 7,960,969 8,590,176 629,207 7.90%
18 Philadelphia 5,689,609 5,973,281 283,672 4.99%
19 St. Louis 2,456,251 2,548,410 92,159 3.75%
20 Detroit 5,321,467 5,423,379 101,912 1.92%
21 New York 19,455,308 19,799,710 344,402 1.77%
22 Cleveland 3,096,511 2,909,182 (187,329) -6.05%
23 Pittsburgh 2,683,011 2,373,640 (309,371) -11.53%
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Table 2
PERSONAL PER CAPITA INCOME: 1970-1996
[Figures in 1992 dollars]
Rank Metropolitan Area
Population
Change Change
1970 1996
1 Boston $18,442 $30,366 $11,924 64.66%
2 Atlanta $16,699 $27,241 $10,542 63.13%
3 Denver $18,083 $28,650 $10,567 58.44%
4 New York $21,121 $33,303 $12,182 57.68%
5 Philadelphia $18,046 $28,413 $10,367 57.45%
6 Washington $19,228 $30,204 $10,976 57.08%
7 Tampa-St.Pete $15,275 $23,984 $8,709 57.02%
8 Minneapolis-St.Paul $18,684 $29,299 $10,615 56.82%
9 Houston $17,021 $26,556 $9,535 56.01%
10 Seattle $18,123 $28,269 $10,146 55.98%
11 San Francisco $21,116 $32,933 $11,817 55.96%
12 Dallas-Ft.Worth $17,272 $26,906 $9,634 55.78%
13 Baltimore $17,300 $26,731 $9,431 54.52%
14 Pittsburgh $16,445 $25,359 $8,914 54.21%
15 St. Louis $17,260 $26,337 $9,077 52.59%
16 Detroit $18,115 $27,113 $8,998 49.67%
17 Portland $17,013 $25,343 $8,330 48.96%
18 Chicago $19,781 $29,195 $9,414 47.59%
19 Cleveland $17,949 $26,025 $8,076 44.99%
20 Phoenix $16,420 $23,377 $6,957 42.37%
21 San Diego $18,296 $24,282 $5,986 32.71%
22 Miami $18,889 $24,341 $5,452 28.86%
23 Los Angeles $19,640 $24,522 $4,882 24.86%
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but just barely.  If only 20 percent of the people projected to move into the ARC area actually choose to
live farther out -- a scenario that is reasonable given current development trends and pro-growth attitudes
of most counties outside the ARC region,  the result would be that between now and 2020 most growth
in the Atlanta commuting shed will occur outside the ARC.
Table 3
DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION CHANGE
1995 - 2020
Region
Population
Change Growth Outside ARC1995 2020
ARC 2,847,000 4,169,700 1,322,700 
MSA 3,432,100 5,026,600 1,594,500 271,800 
BEA-EA 4,626,700 6,776,200 2,149,500 826,800 
1SECTION I.  WHAT IS THE "ATLANTA" REGION?
Just what is the Atlanta region?
L et us ask first what a region is.  Some regions can be very small, such as the region around anelementary school where their residents' children go to learn.  Some regions can be very large, such
as the United States when it comes to national defense.  Regions are defined in a number of
different ways.  The "mountain" region of the U.S. is logically that landscape dominated by the Rocky
Mountains.  The "southeastern" region is that landscape south of the "Mason-Dixon Line" and east of
the Mississippi River.  Within Georgia, there are the "North" and "South" Georgia regions based on
location with respect to the "gnat" line.  But "region" can also mean such landscapes as the "northern tier"
composed of Atlanta's suburbs located roughly north of Interstate 20 and extending perhaps to the
borders of the Carolinas, Tennessee, and Alabama.  "West" Cobb as a region extends roughly west of
Marietta while "South" Fulton extends southward from the city limits of Atlanta.  When we talk about
"region," what do we mean?  The answer is that it depends.
Simply put, a region is a landscape over which everyone within it shares a common interest.  For example,
everyone using the rail system of the Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority (MARTA) can be
considered within MARTA's region.  Based on recent studies, this would be an area extending as far
eastward as Jackson County,  But it could also be defined more narrowly as that landscape containing11
those people who tax themselves to provide this service, which is merely DeKalb and Fulton counties.
If the idea of "region" is amorphous, it is because it means a different landscape for different purposes.
Consider the following politically-defined regions affecting the Atlanta area.
Statistical Regions
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) Economic Areas.  Using
such indicators as newspaper distribution, broadcasting
reception, commuting patterns, banking and financial
relationships, and other means showing how people are
socially and economically linked, the BEA has constructed
183 "economic areas" stretching across the United States.
Figure 1 shows the counties assigned to the Atlanta economic
area by the BEA based on the 1990 census.
Metropolitan Statistical Areas.  Using primarily population size, workplace location, and commuting
patterns, the U.S. Bureau of the Census classifies counties as either metropolitan or nonmetropolitan, and
assigns metropolitan counties to areas called "metropolitan statistical areas" (MSAs).  When two or more
MSAs share the same workforce, they are merged into "consolidated metropolitan statistical areas"
(CMSAs).  Many Georgia counties are currently assigned to one of eight MSAs (see Figure 1).
< Albany;
< Athens;
< Atlanta;
< Augusta;
< Chattanooga (Tennessee);
< Columbus;
< Macon; and
< Savannah
INSERT FIGURE 1
... a region is a landscape over
 which everyone within it
shares a common interest.
2Georgia has no CMSAs presently.  In light of development patterns, it is possible that by 2020 the Athens,
Atlanta, Chattanooga, and Macon MSAs will be merged into an Atlanta CMSA.
Administrative Regions
For all intents and purposes, Georgia is composed of four tiers of decision-making engaged in by elected
officials.  They are:
< The state of Georgia, the legislative decision-making process for which is composed of
156 representatives and 56 senators, with an elected administrative structure composed
of a governor, a lieutenant governor, an attorney general, a superintendent of public
education, and five members of a public service commission.  The state's judiciary is
composed of elected members of the state court of appeal and supreme court, while
superior court judges serving prescribed circuits are elected from voters of those circuits.
< Cities, of which there are 536 in Georgia managed by 3,232 elected officials.
< Counties, of which there are 159 in Georgia managed by 1,551 elected commissioners or
judges.
< Special districts including school districts of which there are 604 in Georgia managed by
1,281 elected officials.
In an attempt to coordinate decisions on certain issues affecting collections of local governments, Georgia
has created 16 "regional development centers" (RDCs), one of which is the Atlanta Regional Commission
(ARC).  Those issues include land use planning consistent with the Georgia Planning Act of 1989,
transportation planning for those RDCs also serving as "metropolitan planning organizations" (MPOs)
pursuant to Federal legislation, and the delivery of a variety of services provided by the state ranging from
technical assistance to elderly care planning.  
Environmental Regions
The environment knows no boundaries and does not elect people to represent its interests.  The principal
environmental regions presented here are those for air and water sheds.
Air Shed Region.  The air Atlantans breathe comes from the same source as that which everyone on the
planet breathes: the atmosphere.  Yet, because of patterns of air movement, terrain, and other factors,
an "air shed" region has been defined by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency that affects all of the
Atlanta MSA and much of the Atlanta economic region.  This air shed is composed of all or parts of 43
counties.  The air shed can be decomposed into two components: one for attainment and one for
nonattainment of federal ambient air quality standards.  There are 13 nonattainment counties, including
all 10 counties of the ARC.
The quality of the air in the Atlanta area is monitored by the federal Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) and the Georgia Environmental Protection Division (EPD) of the Department of Natural
Resources (DNR).  Indeed, because of the region's inability to develop and implement a plan to meet
federal ambient air quality standards, the U.S. Department of Transportation is now withholding certain
transportation funds from use in the 13 counties comprising the nonattainment region.  Lawsuits have
been filed by the Southern Environmental Law Center, Georgia Conservancy, and the Sierra Club to
prevent the Georgia Department of Transportation from using federal funds to build "grandfathered"
projects -- those roads approved for construction before the withholding order was entered.
Watershed Regions.  The Atlanta MSA is bisected by the Appalachian continental divide.  Along much
of Peachtree Street extending from downtown Atlanta through Buckhead, rainwater falling on the
westerly side finds its way into the Gulf of Mexico while rainwater falling on the easterly side finds it way
3to the Atlantic Ocean.  
Water quality and supply is becoming a major regional issue.  The city of Atlanta pays a daily fine of
several thousand dollars to the state for its failure to meet state and federal standards relating to
discharging undertreated wastewater into the Chattahoochee River.  On a different front, Congress
created an interstate compact commission to address concerns of Alabama and Florida on Georgia's use
of water from the Chattahoochee and Coosa rivers which pass through those states.
Water quality is also affected by septic systems that fail and inject undertreated sewage into groundwater
tables.  According to the American Housing Survey for 1996, nearly 400,000 housing units, occupied by
more than one million people, are on septic systems; this is more than a quarter of all homes in the
Atlanta MSA.  In some situations the presence of septic systems may be a time bomb waiting to pollute
groundwater and nearby surface waters.
Real Estate Market Regions
Like the environment, the real estate market is not very sensitive to political boundaries, although there
can be some influence at the margin.  It is, however, sensitive to proximity to market places such as
downtowns and edge cities, trans-shipment points, employment nodes, and other locations of centrality.
In fact, the BEA's definition scheme for economic areas is a reasonably good proxy for the extent to
which the real estate development market operates around central places.
Publicly Regulated Utility Regions
Publicly regulated utilities operate best at certain very large scales of economy but because of their peculiar
economic characteristics, however, their boundaries of service must be akin to franchise limits.
Otherwise, predatory pricing would occur and ultimately result in only one provider, who could then
charge monopolistic prices.
Electrical Power and Natural Gas.  Electricity used throughout north Georgia is provided primarily by
Georgia Power, a subsidiary of the Southern Company.  Olgethorpe power has some franchise areas as
do a number of individual municipalities that own their own distribution (but not production) networks.
The Atlanta Gas Light Company provides most of the region's natural gas.  "Deregulation" of those
utilities means that most existing boundaries will be meaningless within the next few years.  For example,
Atlanta Gas Light, long the region's only provider of natural gas, now must compete for customers who
may now choose from several providers.
Telecommunications.  The local calling area for the Atlanta region encompasses about 30 counties, the
most in the nation.  Several Alabama counties adjacent to this calling area also are eligible for local service.
Because of its size, Atlantans can live and work practically 50 miles from the city center and still be
considered "Atlanta" for advertising purposes.  This is a subtle but influential factor helping to explain
the sprawl the region presently faces.
4Public Sector Functional Regions
Public finance economics seems preoccupied with finding the optimal size of a community wherein the
desired level of public services are provided at minimum cost.  This is called the correspondence principle.
Essentially, at any given point in time and space, each public facility has its optimal service population
across an optimal area.  Unfortunately, the optimal population and area for one service is not the same
as for another.  For this reason, the services created by one jurisdiction may be delivered via contract to
another, or a system of local governments may agree to come to the mutual aid of each other, or all local
governments may come together to provide a common service beneficial to everyone.
Transportation Regions
The Atlanta area is composed of several overlapping transportation systems each operated by separate
jurisdictions, sometimes without coordination between them.  Arguably, the region of the federal
interstate and secondary highway system is the nation while that of state highways, which cross county
and city boundaries, is the state of Georgia.  The Georgia Department of Transportation (GDOT)
manages all state and federal highways.  It receives funds from the federal government, state gasoline
taxes (currently seven cents per gallon), a special sales tax (of three percent on motor fuel sales), some
license and user fees, and hundreds of millions of dollars annually from the state general fund (fed mostly
from state sales and income taxes).  Cities and counties operate their own street networks.
The Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transportation Authority (MARTA) operates a rail and bus system
serving just DeKalb and Fulton counties even though thousands of people living in other counties use
that service.  Actually, MARTA's charter given to it by the
legislature includes five counties, Clayton, Cobb, DeKalb,
Fulton, and Gwinnett, but only DeKalb and Fulton
taxpayers have voted to support it financially.  Cobb
County operates Cobb Community Transit (CCT) while
Gwinnett County recently revealed plans to operate its
own system.  CCT feeds into MARTA rail stations even
though taxpayers of those counties do not share in the
operating costs borne by DeKalb and Fulton county taxpayers.  The Gwinnett county system will
presumably also feed into MARTA.
Summary Observations
The Atlanta area is composed of many different regions.  Indeed, from one perspective, the region of
metropolitan Atlanta is the world.  The idea of region depends greatly on what the issue is.  Although
much of this report focuses on the region served by the Atlanta Regional Commission, in fact many
problems facing the ARC also affect the much larger "commuting shed."  Because half or more of the
growth in Atlanta's commuting shed may occur outside the ARC, it may be necessary to include all
commuting-shed counties in regional decision-making to effective address air quality, water quality and
quantity, and transportation.
The idea of region depends
greatly on what the issue is.
5SECTION II.  WHAT ARE THE REGIONAL CHALLENGES?
I dentifying the problems facing the ARC and its larger commuting shed probably depends on whomone asks, who they are, what they do for a living, and what their social-political-religious orientations
are.  Nonetheless, a reasonable list of regional concerns include:
< Air quality;
< Water quality and quantity;
< Open space preservation;
< Transportation;
< Jobs-housing balance;
< Services and taxes; and
< Fiscal disparities.
Each problem has its own region but they all affect everyone living in the ARC area and to some extent
everyone living in the larger commuting region.
Air
In 1997, 18 percent of the respondents to an Atlanta Journal-Constitution survey indicated that air quality
was their top environmental concern; in 1998 this concern rose to 31 percent.
In May 1996, the Federal Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) put the state of Georgia and the ARC
on notice that the metropolitan Atlanta region would lose federal transportation funds after the current
transportation improvement plan (TIP) expired.  Federal funds presently account for about 80 percent
of all funds for new or expanded highways. Forty-nine highway projects were "grandfathered" but even
they may not be funded because of impending litigation.  The reason metropolitan Atlanta is losing
highway funding is simple: too much air pollution.  Why is air pollution a problem?  Research indicates
that health impacts can be significant and that large portions of the population may be at risk because of
high pollution levels (see Box 1).12
The federal Clean Air Act Amendments (CAAA) require all nonattainment areas such as metropolitan
Atlanta to conform their transportation plans with their respective State Implementation Plan (SIP) for
air quality attainment. In Georgia, the Environmental Protection Division of the Department of Natural
Resources is responsible for the SIP.   A key element of the SIP is an "emissions budget."  This is the13
total of all emissions from all sources (stationary, area, and mobile including reformulated gasoline,
enhanced inspection and maintenance programs and transportation plans and programs) which a non-
attainment area cannot exceed in accordance with federally prescribed time frames that must be
incorporated into their SIP. In effect, budgets are a quantification of the "carrying capacity" of the region
for each pollutant type and is reduced gradually over time as the area nears attainment. After an area
attains the NAAQS, it cannot exceed this cap on emissions and thus must identify ways to offset
emissions increases due to new population growth and jobs.
Atlanta's air pollution predicament is caused in part simply by geography.  Although it is not hemmed in
like Los Angeles, where air cannot escape in the late afternoon, the Atlanta area suffers from "air
stagnation" (see Figure 2.)  The air here moves less than the air in nearly all of the East Coast which
means that emissions build up and are not swept out to other areas.
6BOX 1
HEALTH EFFECTS OF AIR POLLUTION
Carbon Monoxide - Impairs the ability of blood to carry oxygen in the body. Affects primarily the
cardiovascular system, causing angina pain in persons suffering from cardiac disease and leg pain in
individuals with occlusive arterial disease.  Affects animals, especially mammals, similarly.
Lead - Damages the cardiovascular, renal and nervous systems, resulting in anemia, brain damage, and
kidney disease. Pre-school age children are particularly susceptible to brain damage effects. Similar
effects are observed in other mammals.  Affects animals, microorganisms, and plants.
Nitrogen Dioxide - Impacts the respiratory system, causing a high incidence of acute respiratory
diseases.  Young and pre-school children are especially at risk. Damages certain plants and materials.
Degrades visibility due to its brownish color and the conversions to nitrate particles.  Nitrate particles
are also a major component of acid rain.
Ozone - Damages the respiratory system, reducing breathing capacity and causing pain, headache, nasal
congestion and sore throat.  Individuals with chronic respiratory diseases are especially susceptible to
ozone. Injures some plants, trees and materials.
Particulates - Cause irritation and damage to the respiratory system, resulting in difficult breathing,
inducement of bronchitis and aggravation of existing respiratory disease. Also, certain polycyclic
aromatic hydrocarbons in particulate matter are carcinogenic. Individuals with respiratory and
cardiovascular diseases, children and elderly persons are at the greatest risk.  Damages soils, materials
and impairs visibility.
Sulfur Dioxide - Aggravates asthma, resulting in sneezing, shortness of breath and coughing. Healthy
persons exhibit the same responses at higher concentrations. Asthmatic and atopic individuals are the
most sensitive groups, followed by those suffering from bronchitis, emphysema, bronchiectasis,
cardiovascular disease, the elderly and children. Damages some plants and materials. Impairs visibility
and contributes to acid deposition due to its conversion to sulfate particles.
Source: Adapted from Clean Air Briefs, Washington, DC: National Association of Regional Councils.
Since the CAAA requires SIPs only for nonattainment areas, an air pollution budget for the 13-county
nonattainment area has been prepared by the SIP.  However, Atlanta's airshed actually includes 43
counties (stretching Alabama on the west to North Carolina on the north to nearly South Carolins on the
east including Athens and to Macon on the south), some or all of which may also fall into nonattainment.
It is reported in Table 4.
Success of the state implementation depends on, among other things:
< Actions by utility companies to retrofit plants with air cleansing devices, including some
31 plants that have "grandfathered" status;
< Voluntary actions by citizens and firms such as carpooling, transportation demand
management strategies, and increased use of public transportation;
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XNONATTAINMENT AREA NITROGEN OXIDE [NO ] BUDGET
Category 2007 CAAABase (tons)
State Plan
Budget (tons)
Percent
Reduction
Electric utilities (power plants) 92,946 30,158 68%
Nonutulity point (other industries) 34,012 20,472 40%
Area sources (biomass) 11,901 11,901 0%
On-road mobile (mostly autos) 88,363 77,901 12%
Non-road mobile (lawnwmowers, etc.) 27,151 22,714 16%
Total 254,373 162,935 36%
Source: Executive Summary for State Implementation Plan for the Atlanta Ozone Nonattainment Area,
April 28, 1998 (p. 1-11).
< Delivery and use of cleaner "California-style" gasolines, which may add anywhere from
10 to 25 cents to the cost of a gallon of gasoline; and
< No surprises in the projected growth of the region's population or dramatic changes in
the region's aggregate vehicle-miles-traveled (VMT).
Even if the assumptions of the SIP prove correct, however, the Atlanta region may fall back into
nonattainment after 2010 simply because of its growth and development patterns.
Water
Virtually no rivers or streams flow into Georgia which means that nearly all surface waters originate in
the state.   North Georgia's water supply comes mostly from surface sources such as rivers and14
reservoirs.  The Chattahoochee River basin provides much of the water for North Georgia; it is also the
smallest river on which any major metropolitan area depends in the nation.15
Water quality along the Chattahoochee downstream from Atlanta is poor.  Stretches of the river rank as
the nation's most polluted and people are advised to avoid eating fish from those sections.  Indeed, many
kinds of fish have disappeared from the river.16
The Federal Clean Water Act (CWA) restricts total maximum daily loads (TMDLs) to levels already
present in surface waters plus a level of pollution affected waters can absorb.  TMDLs thus vary by
location.  Between 1979 and 1996, Georgia failed to address nonpoint water pollution requirements and
because of a court order has until 2001 to do so.  A direct effect of the order is to limit the amount of
pollutants entering surface waters.  This may cause some industries to relocate.  New wastewater effluent
permits may be suspended.  Compounding the water quality issues are two specific problems: Atlanta and
the neighboring states.
The city of Atlanta has paid daily fines of several thousand
dollars because its combined sewer overflow (CSO) system
failed to prevent the discharge of untreated water into the
Chattahoochee River.  Although improvements have been
made and fines removed, downstream communities still receive
 ... about 95 percent of all
residents receive surface water
that originates in or
passes through Atlanta.
9much of Atlanta's water pollution.  Even within Georgia, about 95 percent of all residents receive surface
water that originates in or passes through metropolitan Atlanta.
Georgia is presently in a "water war" with Alabama and Florida, who depend on water flowing through
Georgia for their water supply.  As metropolitan Atlanta has grown, the supply and quality of water
leaving the area through the Chattahoochee-Flint and Coosa-Tallapoosa rivers has declined to levels that
Alabama claims threaten its economic development opportunities and Florida claims threaten its
Panhandle fisheries.  All three states currently are involved in an interstate compact established by
Congress.  The result of the compact negotiations may be limits or "budgets" guiding each state's use of
waters originating in Georgia.  Those budgets may very well affect the region's growth by mandating:
< Industrial and municipal waste effluent permitting;
< Water rights allocations;
< Water consumption by residential households; 
< Water and wastewater rates to achieve conservation and pollution control objectives;
and
< Water rationing.
Until the compact negotiations are settled, perhaps after 1999, it is difficult to know in advance how the
region will be affected.17
Open Spaces
Between 1972 and 1993, the 10-county ARC area lost two-thirds of its tree cover.   This loss of tree cover18
comes to about 30 acres each day.  During the same period, the Atlanta MSA lost about a third of all
farmland and during the period 1978 to 1992, it lost an average 50 acres of farmland each day (see Table
5).  Even more profound is that the counties outside the metropolitan area lost farmland at a more rapid
pace of 96 acres each day, and the Atlanta economic area inside Georgia lost an average of 146 farmland
acres each day.
Table 5 also shows the rate of farmland loss per new dwelling unit constructed.  The slowest rate of loss
actually is within the ARC area, with one-third of an acre for every new dwelling unit constructed.  For
the balance of the Atlanta MSA, the loss is much greater at 2.6 acres for every new home constructed.
The reason is that houses within ARC counties are mostly on public sewers but houses elsewhere are
mostly on septic systems.  Even greater farmland losses occur in the third-tier counties outside the Atlanta
metropolitan area but within the Atlanta commuting shed.  In those counties, large farms are being
divided into five and ten acre homesites.
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Table 5
FARMLAND LOSS IN ARC AND ATLANTA MSA
1978-92
Region
Farm and Loss
Acres DailyChange Dwelling
ARC (110,850) -22 -0.3 
Rest of metro area (143,656) -28 -2.6 
Total metro area (254,506) -50 -0.7 
Economic area outside MSA (489,506) -96 -6.5 1
Total economic area (744,012) -146 -1.6 
Source:  Census of Agriculture, 1978 and 1992, ARC, Atlanta MSA, and Atlanta
economic area counties as defined in 1998.
Note:  BEA economic area inside Georgia, including Chattanooga portion.
It seems that everyone wants an acre of land next to a farm, but few of us really like what farmers do on
their farm.  As urban development invades rural areas, it imposes "spillovers" on farmers and farmland.
These spillovers reduce the productivity of resource land thereby making such land less valuable for
farming or forest uses and more attractive for speculation or urban development.  Box 2 reviews common
spillover effects.  Indeed, as urban sprawl scatters throughout rural areas, spillovers spread and the value
of land for farming and forestry falls.  Eventually, spillovers can reduce the supply of open space land to
a level below the critical mass needed to sustain the regional resource economic base.
Open spaces provide important functions for the preservation of the world's ecosystem.  For example,
a single moderately sized tree can absorb 400 gallons of water per day and slow the force of rainwater
hitting the ground; in both instances, water runoff is reduced.   Since 1986, the American Forests19
organization estimates that stormwater runoff has increased by 7.4 billion gallons in the 10-county ARC
area.  The cost to properly hold that runoff is estimated to run as high as $2 billion.    Beyond dampening20
stormwater runoff, open space serves a variety of ecosystem functions, as summarized in Box 3.
Transportation
Atlantans commute longer distances to work than in any other metropolitan area in the nation.   Atlanta's21
roadway congestion is the nation's tenth worst and second worst in the South (behind Miami).   For a22
city built on transportation, something seems to be wrong.  Atlanta's urban sprawl is a modern-day legend.
Consider the following facts (Appendix A provides additional comparisons between Atlanta and other
major metropolitan areas):
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BOX 2
COMMON URBAN SPILLOVERS ON OPEN SPACE
Thwarting productivity through restrictions on fertilizers, manure disposal, smells, slow-moving farm
vehicles on commuter roads, use of pesticides and herbicides, noises, dust, glare, hours of operation,
irrigation practices, and moving machinery on roads.
Increased property taxation to pay for new schools, roads, services, and facilities intended to serve
needs of urban households.
Air pollution damage to crops and trees caused by automobiles, industrial activity, and even residential
space heating.
Destruction of crops or equipment or harassment of farm animals by urban households living nearby;
theft of tree crops, berries, and vegetables by nearby urban residents is common.
Eminent domain used to acquire farm and forest land for public uses serving primarily new urban
residential development; roads, reservoirs, and schools are common eminent domain activities,
consuming open space.
Source:  Arthur C. Nelson, "Preserving Prime Farmland in the Face of Urbanization,"  Journal of the
American Planning Association 58(4): 467-488 (1992).
< Atlanta is the most spread out major metropolitan area measured in terms of density.  More land
is consumed per person in metropolitan Atlanta than in anywhere else in the United States and
perhaps the world. (See Table 6.)
< Atlanta leads the nation in vehicle-miles-traveled (VMT) per household (see Table 7.)
< Atlanta is near the bottom in carpooling to work (see Table 8.)
< Atlanta is near the bottom in people working at home (see Table 8.)
< Atlanta is at the bottom in people walking or bicycling to work (see Table 8.)
Why is this?
Part of the reason is that Georgia is the nation's largest state that does not have an urban public
transportation effort within its state department of transportation.  Indeed, the Metropolitan Atlanta
Rapid Transit Authority (MARTA) is the only urban public transportation system that does not receive
support from the state.  Some may argue that the nation's smallest gasoline tax, and the state's
Constitution prohibiting the use of gasoline tax funds for anything but roads discourages development
of alternative transportation modes.  On the other hand, several hundred million dollars annually are
appropriated from the state's general fund to the state DOT for which there are no constitutional
restrictions on use. 
12
BOX 3
OPEN SPACE FUNCTIONS
Gas regulation by absorbing carbon monoxide and ozone, and reducing ultra-violate effects.
Climate regulation by moderating greenhouse gas production.
Disturbance regulation by providing flood control and drought recovery.
Water regulation through irrigation of crops and transportation via water.
Water supply by watershed, reservoirs, and groundwater.
Erosion and sediment control by preventing soil loss through wind, rain or other processes.
Soil formation through weathering of rock and accumulation of organic material.
Nutrient cycling through nitrogen fixation and processing.
Waste treatment in the form of water and air cleansing.
Pollination through movement of floral gametes to sustain plant production.
Biological control through preservation of herbivores by top predators.
Refugia in the form of nurseries, habitat for migratory species, and regional habitats.
Food production of fish, game, crops, nuts, fruits.
Raw materials such as production of wood for fuel or fodder.
Genetic resources for medicines, material sciences, resistance to pathogens and pests.
Recreation such as eco-tourism, sport fishing, hiking, camping.
Cultural in the form of aesthetic, artistic, spiritual, and/or scientific functions.
Source: Adapted from Robert Costanza et al., 1997, The value of the world's ecosystem services and
natural capital, Nature 387: 253-260.
Another part of the reason is that there is no coordinated, regional approach to providing alternatives to
the single-occupant-vehicle (SOV) mode.
Still another reason is that local governments throughout the Atlanta commuting shed are actively seeking
growth but doing nothing to manage its transportation effects.  As growth moves farther away from the
center, VMT will surely rise and opportunities to increase non-SOV modes will become more difficult.
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Table 6
POPULATION DENSITY IN LARGEST METROPOLITAN
AREAS, 1990
Metropolitan Area Density1990
Acres Consumed/
Person
Los Angeles 1,433 0.45 
Miami 1,342 0.48 
New York 1,336 0.48 
Chicago 1,059 0.60 
Philadelphia 896 0.71 
Washington 880 0.73 
San Diego 871 0.73 
San Francisco 841 0.76 
Denver 818 0.78 
Detroit 816 0.78 
Baltimore 788 0.81 
Boston 770 0.83 
Portland 747 0.86 
Seattle 733 0.87 
Phoenix 669 0.96 
St. Louis 661 0.97 
Cleveland 652 0.98 
Tampa 650 0.98 
Houston 609 1.05 
Cincinnati 586 1.09 
Dallas 548 1.17 
Pittsburgh 533 1.20 
Minneapolis-St. Paul 483 1.32 
Atlanta 469 1.36 
Source - Compiled by author from 1990 Census of Population.
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Table 7
VEHICLE-MILES-TRAVELED VIA AUTOMOBILE BY
HOUSEHOLD FOR MAJOR METROPOLITAN
AREAS, 1995
Metropolitan Area Vehicle-Miles-Traveled/
Household
Atlanta 25,542 
Denver 24,280 
Houston 24,256 
Detroit 23,128 
Dallas 22,229 
Miami 22,103 
Average 21,242 
Washington 21,234 
Los Angeles 21,116 
Tampa 20,989 
St. Louis 20,538 
Baltimore 20,484 
Cleveland 20,247 
Seattle 19,852 
Boston 19,736 
Minneapolis-St.Paul 19,664 
Chicago 18,881 
Cincinnati 18,084 
Portland 17,911 
San Diego 17,358 
Philadelphia 16,894 
Phoenix 14,986 
Pittsburgh 14,484 
San Francisco 12,890 
New York 8,244 
Source - Nationwide Personal Transportation Study 1995
15
Table 8
NON-SINGLE PERSON COMMUTING AMONG MAJOR METROPOLITAN AREAS, 1990
Metropolitan Area Carpool Transit Walk, Bike Home Pop. Rank
Atlanta 14.05% 4.82% 1.58% 2.29% 11 
Baltimore 16.73% 7.83% 3.46% 1.88% 17 
Boston 10.29% 10.35% 9.77% 2.51% 8 
Chicago 15.06% 13.95% 11.20% 5.58% 3 
Cincinnati 12.61% 3.74% 1.73% 1.18% 23 
Cleveland 11.44% 4.65% 2.66% 1.68% 15 
Dallas 14.93% 2.41% 2.72% 3.11% 9 
Denver 14.23% 4.40% 2.67% 2.40% 20 
Detroit 10.87% 2.47% 3.72% 2.53% 7 
Houston 16.08% 3.86% 3.10% 2.51% 10 
Los Angeles 17.60% 4.69% 17.14% 12.85% 2 
Miami 16.12% 4.44% 2.85% 2.01% 12 
Minneapolis-St. Paul 12.88% 5.47% 3.28% 3.07% 13 
New York 16.10% 27.22% 38.61% 13.99% 1 
Philadelphia 14.95% 10.42% 10.79% 4.36% 5 
Phoenix 16.07% 2.19% 2.78% 2.02% 19 
Pittsburgh 15.20% 8.12% 3.43% 1.37% 21 
Portland 14.27% 5.63% 1.94% 1.89% 24 
San Diego 16.26% 3.45% 4.59% 4.23% 16 
San Francisco 16.00% 9.63% 10.44% 7.70% 4 
Seattle 13.94% 6.53% 3.65% 3.04% 14 
St. Louis 13.13% 3.04% 1.79% 1.87% 18 
Tampa 14.42% 1.50% 1.89% 1.43% 22 
Washington 20.04% 14.05% 6.35% 4.34% 6 
Source - Nationwide Personal Transportation Study 1995 
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Jobs-Housing Balance
What do air pollution, traffic congestion, and jobs that go unfilled have in common?  A mismatch
between where the jobs are and where people live.  This is called the the Jobs-Housing Balance problem.
Since the 1980s, planners have seen job dispersal as one of the chief contributors to traffic congestion
and overburdened roadways.  As early as the 1960s, analysts found a mismatch between where jobs are
and where people live.  They noted potential economic efficiency and equity concerns in that many jobs
go unfilled in the suburbs because inner city residents cannot access them.  By balancing jobs with
housing, jobs-housing balance strategies seek to promote geographic equilibrium between jobs and
housing.  To be effective, jobs-housing balance programs must emphasize not only a balance between the
number of employment and housing opportunities, but, perhaps more importantly, a balance between
work and housing that workers can afford.  Strategies used to achieve the desired balance include mixed-
use requirements, linkage programs, affordable housing density bonuses and public private partnerships.
Jobs-housing balance is more than just a catch-phrase.  "Balanced" communities are those that provide
housing opportunities for all the people that make it work.  Unbalanced communities lead to longer
commutes which require more highways and cause more air pollution.  Moreover, where communities
engage in exclusionary housing policies (see Appendix B for an example), low income jobs go unfilled and
firms looking for new locations steer clear.
Exclusionary housing policies also exacerbate efforts to reduce poverty.  For example, in 1990, the city of
Atlanta was home to 43 percent of the entire ARC region's poor  despite accounting for only 15 percent23
of the population.  Atlanta's share of the region's jobs fell from 40 percent in 1980 to 29 percent in 1990
while the region's share of jobs found in the northern tier suburbs rose from 40 percent to 52 percent.
One outcome of this shift in jobs is that firms hiring less educated workers had an average job vacancy rate
in 1993 that was three times higher in the northern suburbs than within the city.   Many of those jobs are24
simply not accessible to the working poor because there is no way to get to them.25
Services and Taxes
Urban development is fueled by infrastructure, particularly highways, schools, and water and sewer
systems.  Metropolitan Atlanta's development patterns result in the nation's longest commutes and its
major highways are among the nation's most congested.  A simple solution is to make development more
compact and closer to employment centers, but this is not likely to happen any time soon, if at all.
As development spreads farther out, new infrastructure
is needed even if existing infrastructure is sufficient to
meet development needs.  Local governments in the
ARC region have invested billions of dollars in water
and sewer systems to meet development needs now and
for several years into the future.   Water systems already in place have a collective capacity to provide about
830 million gallons of domestic water daily.   The regional average consumption of water is about 15026
gallons per person per day (including industrial and commercial users).  These water systems have the
capacity to serve about 5.5 million people or enough to meet all development needs of the entire 20-county
metropolitan area by 2020.
Wastewater treatment systems already in place have a collective capacity to provide about 492 million
gallons of treatment daily.   The national average demand for water treatment is about 100 gallons per27
person per day (including industrial and commercial users).  These wastewater systems have the capacity
to serve about 5 million people which, like water, is enough to meet all development needs of the entire
20-county metropolitan area by 2020.  In sum, water and wastewater expansion plans already approved
will provide sufficient capacity to serve all development needs for the entire 59-county commuting shed
by 2020.
... new development brings
new demands on taxes.
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The problem is that much of the new development in the commuting shed will locate outside the ARC
region, so existing and planned systems will be underused collectively.  As development moves farther out,
exurban communities will need to build new or expanded water and wastewater facilities.  The overall
effect is substantial over-construction of infrastructure relative to demand.  This is a recipe for higher taxes
and fees.
In their effort to provide services to voters at the lowest possible cost in terms of taxes, local government
officials seek new development that raises the assessed value of the community.  This breeds new demands
for services which requires more development to fund and the vicious cycle continues.  Only those
communities with relatively high assessed values per capita have the luxury of not having to be aggressive
in seeking growth, but if they use exclusionary practices to maintain their individual well-being
development is displaced, probably relocating farther out.  A substantial share of urban sprawl is thus
related to the maldistribution of property tax capacity combined with limitations on local governments that
restrict their ability to raise most of their funds from other than property taxes.
Urban sprawl usually results in higher costs of services per unit of service delivered.  One effect of sprawl
is a vicious cycle of local government's need for new development for its tax base, but new development
brings new demands on taxes.  It is no surprise that metropolitan Atlanta has one of the fastest growing
rates of tax increases in the nation.  Consider the information provided in Table 9.  Because all growing
regions face higher taxes to meet growing demands, differences between regions in how growth is managed
may affect the rate of tax increases.  Table 9 shows the change in taxes for the 13 fastest growing
metropolitan areas between 1982 and 1992 with populations exceeding 2 million in 1997.  Notice that
Atlanta ranks fifth on this list.  In contrast, Phoenix, which outpaced Atlanta's growth considerably 1970,
had the lowest rate of tax increases although its total revenues remained slightly higher than Atlanta's.  One
reason for Phoenix's relative success in keeping taxes in check is that regional allocation of water resources
combined with finite land resources results in more compact development patterns and higher average
density development than seen in Atlanta.
Fiscal Disparities
People want services and impose upon themselves taxes to pay for them.  In Georgia, the local property
tax is the primary taxing device available to raise funds for services.  The local option sales tax is essentially
a supplement to county operations while school districts have dedicated taxes  from both the property and
sales taxes (depending on exercise of local option sales taxes).  The higher the value of local property the
greater the ability of a municipality to raise taxes from assessments on property.  In Georgia, the customary
method of assessing property for taxation purposes is through estimates of the
value of property in its present use, called "use value," not its potential use, called "site value."  Thus,
parking lots in downtown Atlanta pay a property tax based on parking lot use while the skyscraper next
door pays taxes on its skyscraper value.
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Table 9
CHANGE IN REVENUES PER CAPITA AMONG RAPIDLY GROWING MAJOR
METROPOLITAN AREAS
1982 - 1992
[All figures in 1992 dollars]
Metropolitan Area
Revenue Per Capita
Revenue
Change
Percent
1982 1992 Change
Tampa-St. Petersburg $1,621 $2,373 $751 46.3%
Seattle $2,092 $3,005 $913 43.6%
Dallas-Ft. Worth $1,734 $2,461 $727 41.9%
Miami $2,251 $3,131 $880 39.1%
Atlanta $2,088 $2,870 $781 37.4%
Los Angeles $2,627 $3,600 $972 37.0%
San Diego $2,261 $3,026 $764 33.8%
Minneapolis-St. Paul $2,473 $3,220 $747 30.2%
San Francisco $2,890 $3,761 $872 30.2%
Houston $1,924 $2,460 $536 27.9%
Portland $2,054 $2,619 $566 27.6%
Denver $2,255 $2,807 $552 24.5%
Phoenix $2,486 $3,051 $565 22.7%
Source - Census of Government Finance for 1982 and 1992 compiled by the author.
A municipality with high demand for services and low supply of assessed property value must charge a
relatively high "millage" rate on property.  (One "mill" is equal to one dollar of taxation per $1,000 of
valuation.)  Lithonia, for example, has the region's fourth-lowest assessed value per capita ($7,774) but the
region's highest millage rate, 51.64.  In contrast, Peachtree City, with an assessed value of $17,975 per
capita has a tax rate of 36.10 mills.  (See Table 10.)  At the county level, Cherokee County's assessed value
per resident was nearly half that of Fulton County in 1992 (see Table 11).
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Table 10
ASSESSED VALUE PER CAPITA FOR ARC MUNICIPALITIES, 1997
[Average is $22,603]
Assessed
City Value/Capita
Assessed
City Value/Capita
Assessed
City Value/Capita
Waleska $5,493
Rest Haven $6,595
Lovejoy $7,275
Lithonia $7,774
Pine Lake $9,856
Ball Ground $10,484
Stone Mountain $10,732
Clarkston $10,777
Hampton $11,294
Locust Grove $12,881
Holly Springs $13,299
Palmetto $13,540
Dacula $13,800
East Point $14,042
Sugar Hill $15,851
Riverdale $16,448
Powder Springs $16,866
Acworth $17,230
Mountain Park $17,783
Jonesboro $17,807
Forest Park $18,735
Buford $19,132
Austell $19,203
Fairburn $19,385
Union City $19,525
Decatur $20,360
McDonough $21,765
Lilburn $22,116
Kennesaw $22,314
Brooks $22,371
Atlanta $22,696
Lake City $22,801
Stockbridge $22,888
Tyrone $22,905
Smyrna $23,017
Grayson $23,027
Snellville $23,104
Lawrenceville $23,500
Douglasville $23,803
Canton $24,945
Duluth $26,152
Avondale Estates $26,857
Fayetteville $27,294
Peachtree City $27,909
Woodstock $29,994
College Park $30,003
Roswell $30,457
Berkeley Lake $30,974
Marietta $32,405
Chamblee $32,818
Suwanee $35,750
Doraville $37,472
Conyers $39,323
Norcross $39,693
Alpharetta $49,968
Morrow $50,565
Hapeville $53,337
Source - Georgia Department of Revenue, 1997 Statistical Reports.
Table 11
ASSESSED VALUE PER CAPITA FOR
ARC COUNTIES, 1992
[Average is $22,603]
Assessed
County Value/Capita
Cherokee $12,610
Clayton $21,632
Cobb $21,075
DeKalb $21,109
Douglas $15,161
Fayette $18,962
Fulton $23,837
Gwinnett $22,982
Henry $16,983
Rockdale $19,055
SECTION III.  DECISION-MAKING IN METROPOLITAN ATLANTA
T here are more than 85,000 units of government in the United States managed by nearly one halfmillion elected officials, or roughly one elected official for every 200 people.  Of these, 39,000 are
general purpose local governments including more than 3,000 counties, 19,000 cities, and 16,000
towns or townships.  Of the 46,000 remaining governments, more than 14,000 are school districts and
about 32,000 are special districts managing such diverse services as wastewater collection and treatment,
airports, and mosquito control.  The range of governmental units operating within counties is staggering.
Allegheny County (Pittsburgh), Pennsylvania has nearly 300 governmental units: 86 cities, 42 townships,
43 school districts, and 124 other special districts.  In contrast, New York City, the nation's largest and
wealthiest, has but three: the city and two special districts.
One problem with the proliferation of local governments especially in metropolitan areas (either by
formation of new cities and special districts or simply sprawling out to engulf formerly rural jurisdictions)
is that as the number of governments and elected leaders increases, the ability to solve problems through
joint decision-making is weakened.
Table 12 illustrates the sheer magnitude of local governments and elected officials in the ARC, the Atlanta
metropolitan statistical area (MSA) as defined by the Census, and the Atlanta economic area (EA) as
defined by the Bureau of Economic Analysis.  The BEA's "economic area" for Atlanta includes 59
Georgia counties.  This may be considered Atlanta's "commuting shed" because many new residents in
those counties commute into the 20-county MSA for work.
The commuting shed has 517 units of local government managed by 2,515 elected officials.  Each local
government is created to serve the needs of its residents, workers, and taxpayers.  Each locally elected
official is responsible for serving their constituency.  Not a single local government exists to address any
problem facing the region.  Not a single locally elected official is elected to serve people outside their local
government boundaries.
How is regional decision-making achieved in metropolitan Atlanta?   Because the Georgia constitution
provides local governments with sweeping "home rule" powers and explicitly reserves to them the power
of zoning, regional decision-making of the kind that influences development patterns is restricted.  This
does not mean that regional collaboration is impossible.  Many kinds of regional decisions are being made
on a daily basis by certain units of government, civic organizations, and businesses.  But most government
collaborations are limited to single purposes (Grady Hospital, MARTA) or just jurisdictions within
counties (water and sewer authorities, school districts).  If an issue rises above the county level, how is
it addressed?  For Clayton, Cherokee, Cobb, DeKalb, Douglas, Fayette, Fulton, Gwinnett, Henry, and
Rockdale counties, the place to start is the Atlanta Regional Commission.
Background
The ARC and its predecessor agencies have coordinated the planning efforts in the region since 1947,
when the first publicly-supported, multi-county planning agency in the United States was created. At that
time, the Metropolitan Planning Commission (MPC) served just DeKalb and Fulton counties and the City
of Atlanta.  Since then, the ARC has grown to its current size of 10 counties and 64 municipalities.
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Table 12
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS AND ELECTED OFFICIALS IN ATLANTA REGION
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Statistical
Region
Population
1990 Counties Cities
School
Districts
Special
Districts
Total Local
Governments
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
10-County Atlanta
Regional Commission
2,514,066 10 58 14 58 130 
20-County Atlanta
Metropolitan Area 2,939,531 20 103 28 96 227 1
59-County Atlanta
Commuting Shed 3,920,654 59 244 77 196 517 2
ELECTED OFFICIALS
10-County Atlanta
Regional Commission
2,514,066 97 357 82 44 580 
20-County Atlanta
Metropolitan Area 2,939,531 192 611 146 97 1,046 
59-County Atlanta
Commuting Shed 3,920,654 558 1,416 393 148 2,515 
Source:  Census of Governments 1992.
Notes
1. Bureau of Census "metropolitan statistical area" for 1993.
2. Bureau of Economic Analysis "economic area" excluding counties in Alabama and North Carolina.
The ARC is governed by a board composed of the following:
< One mayor from each of 10 counties, except Fulton County, chosen by a caucus of
mayors from respective counties;
< One mayor from each of the northern and southern halves of Fulton County elected by
a caucus of mayors within those areas;
< The mayor of the City of Atlanta;
< One member of the Atlanta City Council, chosen by the council;
< Fifteen private citizens, one each from 15 multi-jurisdictional districts of roughly equal
population, elected by the 23 public officials otherwise composing the ARC board; and
< One non-voting member appointed by the Board of the Georgia Department of
Community Affairs.
Each year, ARC Board adopts a program of work and a budget for the next calendar year. This includes
all functional planning in the areas of aging, community services, economic development, environmental
planning, governmental services, job training, land use and public facilities, transportation planning and
data gathering and interpretation.
To the outsider, it would appear that all ARC does is try to coordinate land use and transportation
decision-making among its constituent communities.  In fact, ARC does many more things than planning
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as illustrated in Box 4.
Of course, the ARC is best known for its role in planning.  It really has four planning roles.  Its first and
original role is a provider of information for planning and generating regional land use plans.  The second
is implementing provisions of the Georgia Planning Act.  The third is managing development along the
Chattahoochee River corridor.  The fourth is transportation improvement planning in its role as a
Metropolitan Planning Organization (MPO).
Supporting Role
The ARC's principal role is simply providing information to local governments and fashioning regional
plans that local governments hopefully will consider in making their own plans.
Information and data.  The ARC is highly regarded for the quality of data it assembles, evaluates, and
disseminates.  In this role, it:
< evaluates population, land use, and employment patterns and makes projections for a variety of
official uses;
< is the region's center of geographic information system mapping and data bases; and
< conducts surveys.
Regional plans.  Through its role as a metropolitan planning organization (MPO), ARC is in charge of
preparing regional transportation plans and considering land use implications.  In 1975, for example, it
redrew the long-range regional transportation plan to eliminate several expressways and freeways and
instead rely on rail and buses.  Due to a lack of interest and financial capacity of local governments and
the inability of the State Department of Transportation to be a meaningful participant in multi-modal
efforts, transit plans were not implemented and the canceled highways also were not built.  
Georgia Planning Act
In 1989, the Georgia General Assembly passed the Georgia Planning Act, which established a coordinated
planning program for the State of Georgia. This program provides local governments with opportunities
to plan for their future and to improve communication with their neighboring governments. The Planning
Act also assigns local governments certain minimum responsibilities to maintain "Qualified Local
Government" (QLG) status to remain eligible for certain state funds.  The Act requires regional
development centers (RDCs), including the ARC, to perform the following functions:
< Review local plans for consistency with minimum planning standards;
< Mediate planning disputes between local governments;
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BOX 4
What the ARC Does Other Than Development Planning
Area Agency on Aging.  Planning, developing, implementing, and coordinating aging services for
300,000 adults age 60+.
Commute Connections.  Designs commuter programs tailored to meet the needs and expectations of
firms.  
Vision 2020.  Regional visioning to the year 2020.  Ten Collaboratives (Diversity, Economic
Development, Education, Environment, Governance, Health, Housing, Human Services, Public
Safety, and Transportation) work on action plans.  Key initiatives adopted in 1995 were produced with
the involvement of thousands of citizens.  
LINK.  Leadership, Involvement, Networking, Knowledge (LINK) provides the region's leaders with
visits to cities and regions to learn how they handle similar urban challenges.  Visits have included
Denver, Minneapolis-St. Paul, Portland, Seattle, and Toronto.
Metropolitan Atlanta Private Industry Council.  MAPIC facilitates job training programs to help place
low-income youth and unskilled adults usually through assistance from the federal Job Training
Partnership Act (JTPA).
Regional Leadership Institute.  The Metro Business Forum and the ARC established the Regional
Leadership Institute (RLI) in 1991.  Over 500 business and community leaders have gone through the
program.  Graduates become members of the Regional Leadership Foundation (RLF) and work to
constructively address regional problems.
< Prepare and implement plans for Regionally Important Resources (RIRs);
< Evaluate and recommend disposition of Developments of Regional Impact (DRIs);
< Review development impact fee programs pursuant to the Development Impact Fee Act
of 1990; and
< Review local solid waste plans pursuant to the Solid Waste of 1991.
There are a number of special roles the ARC plays in implementing the Planning Act.
Developments of Regional Impact.  Under the Planning Act, development projects that are of sufficient
size to have an impact beyond a local government's jurisdiction are subject to review as Developments
of Regional Impact (DRI). This review is intended to improve communication among governments on
large scale developments and to provide a means of identifying and assessing potential development
impacts before conflicts relating to them arise.  DCA has established minimum size thresholds for
determining whether a development qualifies as a DRI.
The Planning Act, however, does not apply sanctions to local governments who act differently than
recommended by ARC.  A number of recommendations posed by ARC staff have been rejected by the
ARC Board or local governments, or both.
Regionally Important Resources.  A Regionally Important Resource (RIR) is a natural or historic resource
that is designated by the Georgia Department of Community Affairs as being of sufficient importance
to warrant special consideration by the local governments having jurisdiction over that resource. A
resource plan is developed for each RIR that consists of policies and practices designed to manage and
protect that resource. Examples of policies and practices that might be incorporated in a typical resource
plan include: discouraging land uses which are incompatible with resource protection; encouraging
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beautification activities, such as litter or sign control; providing incentives (tax breaks, infrastructure
improvements, etc.) to encourage desirable types of development in and around the RIR; and directing
publicly funded infrastructure improvements (water lines, roads, etc.) to enhance the long term value of
the resource.  An example of a RIR in the ARC area is the Chattahoochee River.
Metropolitan River Protection Act
In 1973, the Georgia Legislature adopted the Metropolitan River Protection Act, giving to the ARC the
power to manage development along the Chattahoochee River corridor.  All land within 2,000 feet of the
river's edge or an impoundment of water serving the river is under ARC's jurisdiction.  Impervious
surfaces and siltation are main issues addressed by ARC when it reviews proposals for development in
this corridor.  The ARC's recommendation to local government is binding unless the local government
appeals the recommendation to the Director of the Georgia Department of Natural Resources, who may
uphold, void, or modify the recommendations.  There has never been an appeal filed since this provision
was instituted in the 1980s.
Transportation Planning
Since 1973, the ARC has served as the metropolitan planning organization (MPO) for the region. In this
role, the ARC undertakes long-range planning for regional transportation plans (RTPs) and implements
those plans through five-year Transportation Improvement Programs (TIPs).  Funds to implement plans
come primarily from the federal government.  Funds are actually expended by state and local agencies.
ARC has made headlines recently for being given "conditional certification" by the Federal Highway
Department and the Federal Transit Administration with requirements to modify its RTP and associated
TIPs to, among other things:28
< Conform with the State Implementation Plan for air quality;
< Recast the RTP as a device to implement the Vision 2020 outcomes;
< Refine its modeling; and
< Enhance citizen participation in the transportation planning process.
In addition, a number of recommendations were made in the areas of improving multi-modalism,
providing better public disclosure, coordinating transportation investment and management decision
making between jurisdictions providing transportation facilities, creating progress evaluation protocols,
and considering effects of ARC actions on adjacent counties.
Summary Observation
Logically, regional decision-making rests in the hands of the Atlanta Regional Commission.  It is a
nationally recognized, first rate, award-winning planning organization.  But it has no authority to
implement plans.  Implementation depends on local governments volunteering to make decisions
consistent with regional plans and decisions.  Unfortunately, there is no penalty and no reward for doing
so.  Even the ARC chairman's own county rejects ARC decisions.
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SECTION IV.  ISSUES IN REGIONAL DECISION-MAKING
T he idea of creating a regional decision-making structure is threatening to many people, particularlylocally elected officials who fear losing influence over shaping their communities in ways they
perceive their constituents desire.  Appendix C provides a review of the theoretical arguments and
empirical findings of the relationship between local government arrangements and dimensions of
governance.  Five issues of governance are of concern here:
< Efficiency of delivery;
< Efficiency of scale;
< Equity;
< Accountability and responsiveness; and
< Political participation.
The central message given in literature seems to be that, rhetoric aside, there is no hard and fast rule about
the optimal arrangements for local governance.  In summary, this literature suggests that:29
< Politically decentralized arrangements may have the edge with respect to efficiency,
especially if special-purpose governments and other complex forms of service delivery
are established to accommodate diverse resident preferences, properties of various
services, and the cost-deflating effects of interjurisdictional competition.
< Politically integrated arrangements may have the edge with respect to standardizing levels
of service, narrowing disparities in service levels, clarifying complex systems of who
provides which services within a region, and engendering strong psychological
attachments to an area.
< Little empirical evidence supports conventional wisdom on local governance. The
traditional view holds that politically decentralized arrangements are superior in political
terms given the democratic advantages of small-scale governance, while politically
integrated arrangements are superior in terms of achieving economies of scale and
minimizing externalities, both of which are dimensions of efficiency. 
< There is an apparent tradeoff between optimizing one value of governance, for example
efficiency, and another value, say equity, in local government arrangements. Different
values of governance are more or less well served by a particular local government
arrangement.  For example, the most efficient systems will tend to be the least equitable;
the most equitable will be the most inefficient.
< Decisions about local government arrangements are value-laden. Those who privilege
equity over efficiency would tend to prefer regionalized governance, while those who
privilege efficiency over equity would tend to support politically decentralized systems.
< Interest in regionalized government, paradoxically, comes not only from proponents of
equity and service standardization, but also from business interests whose belief in the
economic growth-inducing properties of consolidation apparently outweighs efficiency
disadvantages associated with public service monopolies.
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< An appropriate course for local officials and policymakers in any region, therefore, is to
understand tradeoffs between dimensions of governance, ascertain which of these
dimensions takes precedence within the region at a particular time, and craft alliances and
systems of local governance accordingly.
Summary
Literature suggests that the optimal system of governance is some form of a federation, that is an
arrangement that includes a mixture of large and small governments.  Taken to its extreme, such an
arrangement has clear drawbacks for democratic governance, not the least of which are service
coordination problems and the practical inability to monitor and participate in hundreds of individual
government units.  In modified form, a federation would have a local and a regional layer of government,
with functions allocated to appropriate layers to achieve desired levels of efficiency, equity,
responsiveness, and other dimensions of governance. 
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SECTION V.  REGIONAL DECISION-MAKING AND ECONOMIC WELL-
BEING
P olicy analysts and practitioners have long sought guidance on how to improve the welfare of peopleliving in complex metropolitan areas through different governance arrangements.  Competing
views abound.  Recent work by Nelson and Foster (1999) may help to narrow those views mostly
by shedding light on the role of large, general purpose governments and regional decision-making
structures and downplaying the role of small, numerous local governments in improving individual
welfare.   Appendix D reviews their work in detail.  This chapter summarizes the implications of their30
work for policy.
Perhaps the most important role any governance structure can play is improving personal per capita
income.  Nelson and Foster evaluated the relationship between governance structures in nearly 300
metropolitan statistical areas over the period 1977 through 1996 to determine which structures lead to
higher, and lower income growth.
One kind of structure is the extent to which central cities dominate their metropolitan areas in terms of
population share.  Nelson and Foster found that when central cities are unable to expand their boundaries
commensurate with growth, their metropolitan areas lag behind others in improving income.  They also
found that when allowed to be "elastic," as Rusk (1993, 1996) puts it, central cities can elevate incomes
throughout metropolitan areas.  Nonetheless, there is probably an upper limit to the territory over which
central cities may operate to maximize metropolitan-wide income growth is that large.
Large suburban municipalities also contribute meaningfully to income growth.  Very large suburban
municipalities, perhaps rivaling their central cities and especially if they enjoy some level of elasticity, may
be important factors in increasing metropolitan income.  It is possible that a few large jurisdictions create
a competitive environment which leads to more efficiencies in service delivery and ability to marshal
resources to facilitate economic development.  Thus, a region characterized by a few large municipalities
may lead to higher incomes relative to regions dominated by only the central city and numerous small
municipalities.  
Nelson and Foster also found that as the percent of the metropolitan population living in unincorporated
areas increases, income growth lags.  Unincorporated populations are more likely to be served by
numerous, small-scale special service districts than incorporated populations, and efficiencies may be lost.
Two other findings are important.  First, the more
fragmented decision-making throughout the region, as
evidenced by numerous special districts and elected
officials, the lower the growth in personal income.
Second, the presence of a regional government has a
decidedly positive effect on personal income growth,
even when fragmentation may exist.  This is consistent
with the view that individual welfare improves with the
presence of regional governance.
... the more fragmented decision-
making throughout the region ... the
lower the growth in personal income.
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Summary
A reasonable conclusion drawn from recent research is that the interests of the individual within a
complex metropolitan area appear to be advanced best by the presence of central cities that can expand
commensurate with regional growth, few but large suburban municipalities, few elected special-service
district officials, and a metropolitan-wide governance structure capable of coordinating decisions among
local governments to address regional issues.
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SECTION VI.  MODELS OF REGIONAL DECISION-MAKING IN PRACTICE
I n the face of multiple layers and types of local government, how are regional issues addressed hereand in other places?  This chapter reviews those options.
Single-Purpose Mechanisms
Single-purpose decision-making mechanisms recognize that every problem or need for service has its own
unique characteristics for optimal performance.  Wastewater treatment costs per unit usually decreases
as the treatment system becomes larger.  Parks, on the other hand, often provide the best service when
the communities they serve are relatively small and nearby to those who can walk or ride a bicycle to
them.  A number of approaches are used to tailor the particular service to the needs of users at the lowest
reasonable cost.
Special districts.  This decision-making structure is essentially an autonomous single-purpose entity
providing a region-wide function.  The breadth of possible functions is wide, including transit, soil
conservation, health, housing, libraries, parks and recreation, natural resources, sanitation, and water.  In
1992, there were about 3,600 special-purpose governments nationwide serving two or more county areas
and another 4,500 serving a single county.  The ARC has 44 special districts while Atlanta's commuting
shed has 148.  In the Atlanta area, examples include:31
< Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority serving DeKalb and Fulton counties.
< Grady Hospital Authority serving DeKalb and Fulton counties.
< School districts that serve mostly entire counties with some exceptions where individual
cities provide their own education systems (such as Atlanta and Marietta).
< County water and wastewater authorities.
Many special districts are governed by county commission boards but others are governed by elected
officials.  Each has its own revenue base and some receive substantial revenues from state agencies,
particularly education systems.
Contracting among local governments.  Often, one local government creates a service that because of its
characteristics is less costly per unit of delivery if others use it.  For example, the city of Atlanta and
Fulton County contract for wastewater treatment with cities and counties throughout the region.
Privatization of some services with local government oversight is also a form of contracting.
Asset sharing.  Some local governments share in the cost of providing a service that everyone uses.  These
arrangements result in shared funding, even operation, of education, recreation, and transportation
services.  MARTA is an example.
Mutual aid agreements.  Practically every emergency service and public safety operation in metropolitan
Atlanta have mutual aid agreements thereby removing the concern about whose jurisdiction should
respond in emergency situations.  The 911 system operating throughout several metropolitan area
counties (together with their dispatching function) is a form of mutual aid agreement.
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Multi-Purpose Mechanisms
In large metropolitan areas, so many services overlap and service delivery can be so complex that
coordinating them is important to improve efficiency.  This can be done in a variety of ways from various
forms of consolidation to revenue-base sharing to merely creating forums for local officials to share
concerns within a regional context.  
Regional (multicounty) government.   This is a regional decision-making structure in which a single unified
government serves an entire metropolitan region.  More honored in theory than practice, no regional
governments operate in U.S. metropolitan areas. The closest North American model is Unicity, the
government serving Winnipeg and surrounding areas in Manitoba, Canada.
Regional two-tier federation.  This is a decision-making structure in which an upper-tier regional entity
provides areawide functions and autonomous lower-tier local governments provide local functions.  No
two-tier federations exist at the multi county scale in the United States.  At the county scale, Miami-Dade
County (Florida) has operated a countywide two-tier federation since 1957.  A number of two-tier
federations operate in Canada metropolitan regions, including Toronto, Hamilton-Wentworth, and
Vancouver.
City-county consolidation.  This decision-making structure involves a central city and sometimes other
municipal governments merging with the surrounding county to form a single government unit.  Most
of the two-dozen or so city-county consolidations in the United States have involved small metropolitan
areas in southern states characterized by strong county government and relatively few incorporated
jurisdictions.  Well-publicized city-county consolidations occurred in Nashville-Davidson County
(Tennessee) in 1962, Jacksonville-Duval County (Florida) in 1967, and Indianapolis-Marion County in
1969.  Georgia is a leader in consolidations, having three (Columbus-Muscogee County, Augusta-
Richmond County, and Athens-Clarke County).  Table 13 summarizes metropolitan-wide and city-county
consolidations since the early 1800s.
Regional multipurpose district.  These are decision-making systems in which an elected or appointed
entity provides or coordinates two or more services throughout the region while autonomous local
governments (counties, municipalities, townships, special-purpose governments) deliver other services
to the area.  The only elected regional multipurpose district in the United States is the Portland (Oregon)
Metropolitan Services District, formed originally in 1978 and substantially reformed in 1992.  The three-
county district operates the regional zoo, provides regional solid waste disposal and tourism development,
and coordinates land use, growth management, and transportation.  A two-county, indirectly elected
district, known as Metro, provides sewer services and bus transportation in Seattle metropolitan area. In
the Minneapolis-St. Paul metropolitan area, the 17-member appointed Twin Cities Metro Council
performs regional planning services, implements the region's fiscal disparities (tax base sharing) program,
and coordinates transportation, sewer and other services provided by areawide entities.  (See Table 14.)
General revenue-base sharing.  At any point in time a formerly thriving area of a region is in decline and
its revenue base deteriorates resulting in higher tax rates to meet basic levels of service while other parts
of the same region enjoy increasing revenue bases thereby being able to keep tax rates down.  Some
regions around the nation engage in what is called "tax base" or "revenue base" or "asset" sharing.  The
best known example of this is the Minneapolis-St. Paul metropolitan area which, since the early 1970s,
has pooled 40 percent of the region's incremental property tax revenue attributable to nonresidential
development and redistributed it based on a formula.  In the early years, Minneapolis was a net recipient
but it is now a donor.
Table 13
METROPOLITAN AND CONSOLIDATED CITY-COUNTY GOVERNMENTS
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Name Population1990 
Formation
Year
METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENTS
Twin Cities Metropolitan Council, MN 2,464,124 1967 
Metropolitan Portland, OR 1,239,842 1978 
Total Metropolitan Government Population 3,703,966 
CITY-COUNTY CONSOLIDATIONS
New Orleans-Orleans Parish, LA 496,938 1805 
Boston-Suffolk County, MA 663,906 1821 
Nantucket Town-Nantucket County, MA 6,012 1821 
Philadelphia-Philadelphia County, PA 1,585,577 1854 
San Francisco-San Francisco County, CA 723,959 1856 
New York City (5 boroughs), New York 7,332,564 1874-98
Denver-Denver County, CO 467,610 1902 
Honolulu-Honolulu County, HI 836,131 1907 
Baton Rouge-East Baton Rouge Parish, LA 380,105 1947 
Hampton-Elizabeth City County, VA 133,793 1952 
Newport News-Warwick City, VA 170,045 1952-58
Chesapeake-South Norfolk-Norfolk County, VA 151,976 1962 
Virginia Beach-Princess Ann County, VA 393,069 1962 
Nashville-Davidson County, TN 510,784 1962 
Jacksonville-Duval County, FL 672,971 1967 
Juneau-Greater Juneau, AK 26,751 1969 
Indianapolis-Marion County, IN 797,159 1969 
Carson city-Ormsby County, NV 40,443 1969
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Table 13
METROPOLITAN AND CONSOLIDATED CITY-COUNTY GOVERNMENTS (cont.)
CITY-COUNTY CONSOLIDATIONS (cont.)
Columbus-Muscogee County, GA 179,278 1970 
Sitka-Greater Sitka Borough, AK 8,588 1971 
Lexington-Fayette County, KY 186,048 1972 
Anchorage-Greater Anchorage Borough, AK 226,338 1975 
Ananconda-Deer Lodge, MT 10,278 1976 
Butte-Silver Bow County, MT 33,941 1976 
Houma-Terrebonne Parish, LA 96,982 1984 
Lynchburg City-Moore County, TN 4,741 1988 
Athens-Clarke County, GA 87,594 1992 
Augusta-Richmond, GA 189,719 1996 
Total Consolidated Population 16,413,300 
Table 14
REGIONAL MULTI-PURPOSE DISTRICTS
Feature Twin Cities Metro Portland
Region Metropolitan Minneapolis-St. Paul. Metropolitan Portland, Oregon.
Governing body
structure
Gubernatorially appointed 16 member
council representing districts and one
executive officer.
Six directly elected members
representing districts and one
executive elected at-large.
Management
Runs region's transit, water, and sewer
services.
Runs the region's zoo and
convention center.
Decision powers
Coordinates long range land use
planning among local governments. 
Facilitates low income housing
provision.
Coordinates long range land use
planning within regional urban
growth boundary; fair share housing
and employment involvement.
Primary revenue
sources
Member dues, transportation planning
funds, water and sewer fees.
Member dues, zoo tax base,
transportation planning funds, solid
waste tipping fees.
Legal authority
Statutorily created; creature of the
state.
Created by referendum as special
district supported by majority of
voters of affected counties.
Councils of Government.  At last count there were about 540 regional councils of government (COGs),
down about 20 percent since their height in the late 1970s.  COGs are essentially voluntary associations
although in some states (such as Georgia and Florida) they are created by statute.  In Georgia they are
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established by statute and known as regional development centers (RDCs).  ARC is authorized by separate
statutes, however.  Their functions are typically limited to studying planning issues, recommending but
not implementing regional development policies, and performing certain regional social service functions.
 
Metropolitan Planning Organizations.  There are 340 federally supported metropolitan planning
organizations (MPOs).  They have substantial influence over the use of federal transportation funds in
many states.  MPOs prepare transportation plans that must meet air quality standards and attempt to
influence local land use planning accordingly.  Almost half of the MPOs are part of a COG, such as the
ARC.  It appears that ARC, however, is the only MPO to not have a transportation plan that meets target
federal air quality standards.
Nonstructural Regional Cooperation Options
These regional decision-making approaches are characterized by autonomous local governments that
collaborate to greater or lesser degrees to coordinate and/or provide supramunicipal service delivery.
They include formalized regional governance networks, functional transfers, regional asset districts,
intermunicipal service agreements, privatization or nonprofitization, and other forms of voluntary and
formalized cooperation between government units.  Although systematic, comparative data are not
available, every metropolitan relies to at least some degree on nonstructural options for service delivery.
For example, a recent survey of such organizations by the National Academy of Public Administration
and the National Association of Regional Councils found several hundred such organizations including
such forms as:
< Private sector and non-profit organizations providing one or more regional services (such
as United Way);
< Regional problem-solving organizations (such as Regional Leadership Institute and its
companion Regional Leadership Foundation);
< Regionally-based "think tanks" (such as Research Atlanta);
< College or university-based study institutes (such as Georgia State University’s School of
Policy Studies and Georgia Tech's Center for Transportation Studies); and
< Regional business and civic organizations (such as the Regional Business Coalition).
Summary
Models of regional governance abound.  Each is designed to address issues, sometimes single issues and
other times multiple issues.  Each has its own scale of effectiveness, from merging municipalities within
a single county with the county itself to two-tiered federations, where a regional government manages
such services as transportation and water and local governments manage such functions as garbage
collection and police.  The Atlanta area has several forms of regional government but those that seem to
be effective have one thing in common: they have certain powers and a financial base with which to
exercise them.  
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SECTION VII.  NOW WHAT?
A n argument can be made that unless major issues facing metropolitan Atlanta are addressedthrough a regional decision-making process, the ability of the area to sustain economic
development will be threatened.  This chapter speculates on the extent to which there is
consensus among locally elected officials on a different approach to making regional decisions affecting
key issues, what the state constitution offers in the way of opportunities for the legislature to create
metropolitan decision-making structures, and the key elements shaping those structures.
Is There Consensus?
There seems to be very little consensus among locally elected officials on what actions should be taken
to address these and other issues at the regional level.  Because they are elected to represent local, not
regional, interests, their decisions may, in effect, advance the welfare of their constituents regardless of
the costs imposed on others.
There may be three areas where locally elected officials appear to have reasonable consensus: (1) regional
transportation; (2) air quality; and (3) water quality and supply.  There is no consensus on how to address
those policies area, however, mostly because elected officials argue that should be trusted with the job.
Regional transportation has received the most attention.
The  M etropolitan  A tlanta  Transporta t ion
Initiative (MATI), headed by metropolitan
Atlanta's business leaders and composed of
leading regional and state public officials, has
advanced the idea that a single, regional
transportat ion  agency  is  n eeded.   Its3 2
recommendations include:
< Set and communicate short- and long-term performance objectives for Atlanta's regional
transportation system;
< Adopt aspirations-based strategic planning and land use compliance incentives; 
< Create a regional transit authority to plan and coordinate all transit in the region;
< Secure adequate and flexible funding for transportation needs;
< Build public awareness about transportation issues and alternatives to single occupancy
vehicle travel;
< Mobilize the business community to support recommendations and change commuter
behavior; and
< Empower one regionally focused agency with integrated responsibility for planning,
resource allocation/authority, and monitoring of implementation for all forms of
transportation in the Atlanta region.
 ... three areas where locally elected officials
appear to have reasonable consensus: (1)
regional transportation; (2) air quality; and
(3) water quality and supply.
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Issues such as whether that authority should reside with ARC or an new unit of government, who would
manage its decision-making (elected or appointed officials), how it would raise funds, and especially how
it would interact with both local and state government agencies were left unanswered.  Moreover, there
is little evidence that regionalized transportation services alone will effect improvement in other areas of
regional interest.
In all other respects, there is very little evidence of any consensus among locally elected officials for a
need to reform regional decision-making to address any other issue of regional concern.  Then, again, this
should be expected.  Indeed, efforts to create the metropolitan governance structures in Portland,
Oregon, and in Minneapolis-St. Paul were led not by locally elected officials but by groups of business
and civic leaders, and state legislators (see Savitch and Vogel, 1996; Abbott, Howe and Adler, 1994).  This
is not surprising.  Numerous studies of solving problems that cross jurisdictions find that it is the state
legislature that holds the key (for example, see Burby and May, 1997) because it is the only body that has
the ability to rise above local interests.
The Constitutional Framework
To some, the Georgia Constitution appears to prevent any meaningful effort to address regional issues
effectively.  The constitution at Article IX, Section II provides at Paragraph IV:
P lan n in g  an d  zo n in g .  The governing body of each county and of each municipality may adopt plans and may exercise the
power of zoning. 
Combined with home rule authority, it is easy to dismiss as fruitless any role the state may advance to
effect regional decision-making through local government planning and zoning.  But this interpretation
may be too narrow.  Moreover, it ignores other provisions of the constitution that appear to provide the
legislature with considerable flexibility in addressing regional problems.  These provisions allow
involvement   in local planning and zoning, formation of regional multi-purpose districts patterned after
metropolitan Portland or the Twin Cities, and the use of incentives to facilitate local efforts to meet
regional challenges.
Local plans and zoning.  Consider the rest of what Article IX, Section II say at Paragraph IV:
This authorization shall not prohibit the General Assembly from enacting general laws establishing procedures for the exercise
of such power.
The word procedures can include such elements as:
< Criteria for the content of plans;33
< The requirement that land use decisions be made consistent with plans and zoning;  and34
< The requirement that plans and zoning be consistent with state environmental, natural
resource, and vital area policies (see also Article III, Section VI, Paragraph II(1)).
It may be possible,  at least in theory,  to assure that locally prepared plans and zoning address
meaningfully regional and state concerns.
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Moreover, consider the following language when parsed from Article III, Section VI, Paragraph II:
(a) Without limitation of powers granted (elsewhere in the Constitution). . . the General Assembly shall have the power
to provide by law for:
(2) The participation by the state and political subdivisions and instrumentalities of the state in federal programs
and the compliance of laws relating thereto, including but not limited to the powers, which may be exercised to
the extent and in the manner necessary to effect such participation and compliance, to tax, to expend public
money, to condemn property, and to zone property.
Consider, for example, that much of metropolitan Atlanta is no longer eligible for participation in federal
highway funding programs and is not in compliance with federal clean air standards.  This writer's
understanding of the plain language of this part of the Georgia Constitutions suggests that the legislature
could pass general laws that result in state-level zoning of property to achieve eligibility for federal
highway funding and compliance with federal air quality standards.  The clause "without limitation of
other powers" suggests that this provision of the constitution may supersede home rule delegations.
Although much of this is speculative on both the willingness of the legislature to characterize
constitutional meaning and the courts allowing the legislature to do so, it is interesting that the Georgia
Constitution may be more flexible than some believe.  The specific case of how House Bill 489 (HB 489)
constitutional provisions to advance the state's interest over local government decisions will be discussed
later.
Regional multi-purpose districts.  Much has been made about the effectiveness of efforts in metropolitan
Portland and the Twin Cities to address regional concerns while maintaining considerable latitude among
local governments to manage locally important affairs.  One interpretation of the Georgia Constitution
indicates that the legislature could create a multi-purpose district affecting multiple jurisdictions, such as
the current ARC area or the census-defined metropolitan statistical area or the larger commuting shed.
Article III, Section VI, Paragraph VI provides:
Sp e c ia l d is t ric t s .  As hereinafter provided in this Paragraph, special districts may be created for the provision of local
government services within such districts; and fees, assessments, and taxes may be levied and collected within such districts to pay,
wholly or partially, the cost of providing such services therein and to construct and maintain facilities therefor.  Such special
districts may be created and fees, assessments, or taxes may be levied and collected therein by any one or more of the following
methods:
(a)  By general law which directly creates the districts.
(b)  By general law which requires the creation of districts under conditions specified by such general law.
(c) By municipal or county ordinance or resolution, except that no such ordinance or resolution may supersede a
law enacted by the General Assembly pursuant to subparagraphs (a) or (b) of this Paragraph.
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Parsing the words and phrases indicates the following:
< Special districts is not apparently limited to just municipality or county boundaries and
would seem to include multiple counties and municipalities within them, nor is it
apparently limited to the provision of a single service.
< Local government services may be defined by the legislature to mean any or all of those
services listed in Article III, Section VI, Paragraph III which include streets and roads
(subparagraph (c)), stormwater and wastewater systems (subparagraph (d)), water systems
(subparagraph (e)), public transportation (subparagraph (f)), building codes (subparagraph
(g)), and air quality control (subparagraph (h)).
< Methods of empowerment can include outright formation by general law, membership
by local governments meeting certain criteria such as being within an air quality
nonattainment area; an area affected by the impending water wars compact; a
metropolitan statistical area as defined by the U.S. Bureau of the Census; or any other
triggering device.
Membership also can be construed as voluntary through action of local ordinance or
resolution with the incentive given to voluntary membership being continuation of state
grants (see below).
Incentives.  Local governments’ decisions seem based almost entirely on self interest.  When choosing
between alternatives that either would leave the local community better off but the region as a whole
worse off or vice versa, the decision will usually be beggar-thy-neighbor.  One way in which to assure that
decisions made in local self-interest reflect regional concerns is to provide financial and permitting
incentives to local governments that consider regional concerns.  The constitutional basis for crafting
financial incentives is found in Article VII, Section III, Paragraph III:
Gran ts  to  c o u n t ie s  an d  m u n ic ip a lit ie s .  State funds may be granted to counties and municipalities within the state.
The grants authorized by this Paragraph shall be made in such manner and form and subject to the procedures and conditions
specified by law.
The constitution provides additional basis for crafting regulatory incentives including conditions for
permitting certain activities is found in Article IX, Section II, Paragraph III(c):
Nothing contained within this Paragraph shall operate to prohibit the General Assembly from enacting general laws relative
to the subject matters listed in subparagraph (a) of the Paragraph (relating to police and fire protection, garbage and waste
disposal and disposal, public health facilities, street and road and related facilities, parks and recreation facilities, storm water
facilities, water facilities, public housing, public transportation facilities, libraries and related facilities, terminal and dock and
related facilities, building codes, and air quality control measures) or to prohibit the General Assembly by general law from
regulating, restricting, or limiting the exercise of powers listed therein.
Conceivably, everything local government does affecting development may be regulated by the General
Assembly.  Thus, water effluent permits, the authority to issue septic system permits, and a variety of
other permitting exercises by local government could be incentives given to local governments for
becoming members of multi-purpose, multi-jurisdictional special districts.
How does this relate to "home rule" provisions elsewhere in the constitution?  It would appear that local
governments are free to act in each of those specified areas but the legislature is also free to regulate the
manner of action.  The local exercise of powers to provide those services may be made subject to state
if not regional oversight.  
The Georgia General Assembly appears to enjoy considerable flexibility in crafting state-level approaches
to addressing regional issues.
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A Working Model - HB 489
Because of its flexible constitutional framework, the Georgia General Assembly is free to advance
innovations that can improve operations of local government.  One innovation is the Service Delivery
Strategy Act of 1997, known popularly as HB 489.  It requires each county and the cities within that
county to adopt a Service Delivery Strategy by July 1, 1999.   The legislation requires local governments35
to:
< Take a careful look at the services they provide;
< Identify overlap or gaps in service provision;
< Develop a more rational approach to allocating delivery; and
< Rationalize funding of those services among the various local governments and
authorities in each county.
In effect, the legislation calls for the development of 159 Service Delivery Strategies, one for each county
area. Counties are responsible for initiating the process.  The legislation is intentionally vague, leaving
much discretion to cities and counties in how they go about developing a Service Delivery Strategy.  In
general, each county Strategy must include:
< An identification of all services presently provided in the county by cities, counties and
authorities;
< An assignment of which local government will be responsible for providing which service
in what area of the county;
< A description of how all services will be funded; and
< An identification of intergovernmental contracts, ordinances, resolutions, etc. to be used
in implementing the Strategy, including existing contracts.  
The Strategy is supposed to also provide for (1) the elimination of duplication of services, or an
explanation for its existence, justification of water and sewer rate differentials to customers located
outside municipal boundaries, (3) identification of revenues to provide services for unincorporated areas,
(4) elimination of conflicts land use plans between the county and its cities, and (5) formation of a process
to resolve land use disputes over property to be annexed. 
The major innovation involved in HB 489 is its use of financial and permitting incentives to encourage
local government compliance with the statute.  Beginning on July 1, 1999, state-administered financial
assistance, grants, loans or permits will not be issued to any local government or authority which is not
included in a DCA-verified Strategy.  In addition, projects which are inconsistent with a Strategy will be
ineligible for state funding and permits.
All local governments in a county are subject to the penalties for noncompliance even if only one
jurisdiction within the county holds up adoption of a Strategy.  Some examples of funds at stake are local
area road project (LARP) grants, city-county road contracts, Georgia Environmental Financing Act
(GEFA) water and sewer loans, recreation grants, and community development block grants (CDBG).
The Act also applies to any permit administered by the State such as water withdrawal permits, wastewater
treatment permits and solid waste disposal facility permits issued by the Environmental Protection
Division.
The Framework for Structuring Regional Decision-Making
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If the current structure for regional decision-making is to be modified, a number of considerations must
be addressed such as
< What are the issues?
< What is the region associated with each issue?
< How shall a decision-making body be appointed?
< How shall a decision-making body be composed?
< What powers will it have?
< How can local governments become stakeholders in regional decision-making?
< Who backs it up?
What are the issues to be addressed?  There are clearly three regional issues for which there already is
consensus that something must be done:
< Transportation (because of congestion and air pollution);
< Air pollution (because of federal sanctions and public perception of eroding quality of
life); and
< Water (because of impending "water wars" agreements affecting quality and supply).
These challenges overlap to some extent.  Urban sprawl facilitated by highway proliferation consumes
more land, creates more traffic which in turn increases both air and water pollution.  Addressing these
challenges in a coordinated manner, then, necessarily requires addressing other issues, namely:
< Improving jobs-housing balance (which will lead to reduced commuting and improve air
quality);
< Making more efficient use of infrastructure (by avoiding construction of duplicative
facilities and using existing infrastructure better);
< Reducing fiscal disparity among jurisdictions (otherwise there is little incentive for less-
endowed communities not to pursue expansion of their property tax base); and
What is the region associated with each issue?  Recall that each issue has its own "region," all of which
extend beyond the 10-county ARC region to include anywhere from 13 to 59 counties or perhaps more.
If an issue is addressed by a decision-making body that does not cover its true area, the issue will not be
adequately addressed and perverse outcomes could arise.  For example, if efforts to manage transportation
and improve air quality are limited to just the ARC area, development could be shifted farther out
probably making the transportation and air quality problems worse.  Consider the following:
< The air quality "region" includes a 13-county "nonattainment" area but it could just as
easily include the 20 county metropolitan statistical area and more likely the 43 county
airshed composing most of North Georgia.
< The water quality and quantity "region" may very well be those counties in Georgia
through which the "water wars" rivers run (Chattahoochee, Flint, Coosa, and Tallapoosa);
50-plus counties extending from the North Georgia mountains to the Florida border.
< The transportation "region" is the commuting shed of the greater metropolitan area
composed of the 59 Georgia counties of the BEA's economic area for Atlanta. 
How shall a decision-making body be appointed?  The ARC is a creature of state law, as are all Georgia's
RDCs and economic development regions.  Those regions have little influence over local decision-making
and so their efforts to address regional issues are not effective.  It falls to the state legislature to use its
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constitutional authority to create regional decision-making mechanisms.
How shall a decision-making body be composed?  There are generally three options:
< Internal appointment.  This is the case presently with the ARC and its sister RDCs
around Georgia (see the selection format above).
< External appointment.  The 17-member Twin Cities Metropolitan Council is appointed
by the governor (with advice and consent by the state senate).
< Election.  Only metropolitan Portland has an elected governing body (seven members
from districts plus an elected executive officer and an elected auditor).
What powers shall it have?  Three powers seem essential:
< The power to study an issue so that learning and education is part of the solution.
< The power to plan.
< The power to implement.  This is the major shortcoming of present regional decision-
making.  The constitution appears to enable the legislature to create multi-purpose, multi-
jurisdictional special districts and specify not only the powers but the method of
financing.  These powers are among the most broad of any state constitution, and need
to be tapped here.
How can local governments become stakeholders in regional decision-making?  Effective regional decision-
making depends on all government units sharing common interests.  
State resources could be withheld from local governments that fail to implement their part of regional
plans devised through a regional decision-making process.  This is possible in Florida, New Jersey,
Oregon, and a few other places that also face serious regional problems.  In Georgia, the state sends local
governments millions of dollars annually for infrastructure, community development, and other purposes.
Those resources may be considered an incentive to local government to implement their part of a regional
plan.  Home rule and local land use planning powers would not be affected because local government
would have the option of implementing their part of regional plans and thereby receive state resources
or simply going their own way without those resources.
This is the approach of the Strategic Service Delivery Act (HB 489).  Recall that it requires each county
and the cities within that county to adopt a Service Delivery Strategy that lays out which unit of
government provides which service and how it will be financed.  Among other things, the Act is intended
to eliminate duplication of services.  
The Strategic Service Delivery Act is an invention of the Georgia General Assembly to encourage local
governments to improve the delivery of services and facilities within counties.  It essentially makes local
governments stakeholders in the service delivery planning process since they all share the same potential
outcome: loss of state incentives to continue to grow. This approach, if extended to regional decision-
making processes, may provide communities with sufficient reason to be meaningful partners in
addressing regional problems.
More to the point, the state constitution appears to give the legislature the authority to use state financial
and permitting authority as incentives.  This is the approach Governor Roy Barnes is using to advance
the state's interest in regional transportation through passage of SB 57 during the 1999 Legislative
Assembly, creating the Georgia Regional Transportation Authority.36
Who backs it up?  Every level of government is primarily interested in serving itself.   Citizens elect city
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council members and members of county boards of commissions to look after local affairs; to do
otherwise is to violate the trust of the electorate.  To "do the right thing,"  local government officials need
someone to blame.  The more distant the target of blame the better.  Planning in Florida and Oregon to
preserve and enhance quality of life is now realizing tangible benefits.  One secret to their success is that
local government officials are able to explain to their electorates that "the devil made me do it."  Privately,
many locally elected officials applaud the "backstop" role of higher levels of government.
Should a regional decision-making process be the backstop to assure that local governments "do the right
thing?"  Perhaps it would be better to have a state-level back up, thereby making regional decision-making
processes facilitators.  This arrangement makes RDCs and the ARC allies with their constituent local
governments.
Summary
Research shows that effective regional decision-making depends on all government units sharing common
interests.  The Georgia Constitution seems to provide the mechanisms through which the state may create
effective regional decision-making arrangements.  It may do so by making all local governments
stakeholders in regional decision-making.  This is a lesson that seems to have learned in part through HB
489 and to a limited extent by SB 57 (creating the Georgia Regional Transportation Authority).  One form
of stakeholder interest is state financial support and permits granted to local governments.  To create a
regional decision-making arrangement that is truly effective in addressing regional concerns, state
resources and permits especially for wastewater discharge may need to be withheld from local
governments that fail to abide by regional decisions.  Georgia sends local governments hundreds of
millions of dollars annually for infrastructure, community development, and other purposes.  Those
resources may be considered an incentive for local governments to make local decisions consistent with
regional decisions.  Georgia also permits all wastewater treatment systems in the state for discharge into
public waters.  Those permits may be suspended or conditioned if local governments using those systems
fail to abide by regional decisions.  Home rule and local land use planning powers may not be affected
because local government would have the option of acting consistent with regional decisions to receive
state resources and maintain permits or going their own way without those resources or permits. 
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SECTION VIII.  HOW TO SUSTAIN GROWTH
T o continue its economic success story, metropolitan Atlanta must raise regional decision-makingto a new level.  Traditional methods of decision-making based primarily on individuals, firms, and
politicians working in cozy settings straddling the Chattahoochee must give way to new forms of
decision-making that protect the air and water, improve accessibility generally and especially to jobs, and
make local decision-makers stakeholders in larger, regional concerns.
Can this be done?  The consequences of not addressing truly regional issues through some decision-
making mechanism that can solve problems include deteriorating quality of life, additional federal
sanctions, and loss of state and federal support for continuing growth.
Changing how decisions are made is difficult and sometimes not worth the trouble.  If nothing is done
what would be the outcome?  Consider that development will slow down as the region's perceived quality
of life continues to deteriorate.  Cleveland uses quality of life benchmarks to show that it is a better place
to live than Atlanta.  If Cleveland can make this claim, then certainly many other places with more
pleasant locations will.
The region will continue to grow.  The challenge is deciding how to manage it.  This is done best through
a regional decision-making process where everyone is a stakeholder.
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APPENDIX A
Comparing Transportation Indicators
Among Major Metropolitan Areas
One way to compare metropolitan Atlanta's transportation situation relative to other major metropolitan
areas is to use an achievement index.  "Achievement" is defined as the difference between an MSAs rank
in total population and its rank in terms of percent of its population using other than single-occupant-
vehicles (SOV) for their journey-to-work such as carpooling, transit, walking, bicycling, or working at
home.  The closer an MSA is to "0", the closer the match between population size and non-SOV use rank.
Very large metropolitan areas, such as New York, Chicago, and Los Angeles, are so difficult to get around
relative to smaller areas that carpooling and transit use will be higher.  Alternatively, some metropolitan
areas, such as Cincinnati and Portland, will be small enough that people can get around easily and so
carpooling and transit use will be low relative to larger areas.   For example, Table A-1 shows that the
index for carpooling in Los Angeles is "0", which means that its rank for carpool use (2) is equal to its
population ranking (2).  Chicago and New York have a "0" for transit use, meaning that their ranks for
transit use are equal to their population rankings (1 and 3 respectively).
A positive number means that a metropolitan area is performing well relative to its population rank.  For
example, San Diego's achievement index for people working at home (see Table A-1) is "8" which means
that despite being the 16th largest metropolitan area, it ranked 8th in the percent of workers working at
home.  (New York, the largest metropolitan area and presumably the most difficult to get around, also
has the highest rate of people working at home so its "achievement index" is a neutral "0".)  A negative
number means that a metropolitan area is performing poorly relative to its population rank.  Atlanta's "-
13" for people walking or bicycling to work means that despite being the 11th largest metropolitan area
it ranked 24th (last) in the percent of people walking or bicycling to work (see Table A-2).
Using the "achievement index," Atlanta is shown to be bottom or near the bottom in three of four key
categories of non-SOV use: carpooling, walking or bicycling, and working at home.  It nearly achieved
its expected rank in transit ("-1" which means it ranked 12th in percent of commuters using transit as
compared to its 11th ranking in population).
Table A-3 sums all "achievement index" scores to gather an overall impression of how each metropolitan
area fares in non-SOV use; only Detroit ranks worse than Atlanta.  Although one may observe that
because Atlanta is one of the fastest growing areas in the nation and has not had enough time to develop
non-SOV opportunities, in fact the fastest growing area (Phoenix) had the sixth highest level of
achievement and with the exception of Dallas every metropolitan area that grew more than 50 percent
since 1970 achieved better than Atlanta.
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Table A-1
CARPOOL AND TRANSIT ACHIEVEMENT INDEX
Metropolitan Area CarpoolIndex Metropolitan Area
Transit
Index
Baltimore 14 Pittsburgh 14 
San Diego 12 Portland 14 
Phoenix 11 Baltimore 9 
Pittsburgh 11 Cincinnati 5 
Portland 9 Seattle 5 
Tampa 8 Denver 4 
Miami 7 Washington 4 
Washington 5 Boston 3 
Denver 4 Minneapolis-St.Paul 2 
Houston 3 Cleveland 1 
Cincinnati 2 Philadelphia 1 
Los Angeles 0 Chicago 0 
St. Louis -1 New York 0 
Dallas -4 Atlanta -1 
Seattle -4 San Francisco -2 
New York -5 St. Louis -2 
San Francisco -5 Tampa -2 
Atlanta -6 Miami -3 
Cleveland -7 San Diego -3 
Minneapolis-St.Paul -7 Phoenix -4 
Philadelphia -7 Houston -7 
Chicago -8 Los Angeles -11 
Boston -16 Dallas -13 
Detroit -16 Detroit -14 
Source - Compiled by the author from Nationwide Personal Transportation Study 1995. 
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Table A-2
WALK-BIKE AND WORK-AT-HOME ACHIEVEMENT INDEX
Metropolitan Area Walk-BikeIndex Metropolitan Area
Work-at-Home
Index
Pittsburgh 9 San Diego 8 
San Diego 8 Denver 6 
Baltimore 6 Portland 6 
Portland 4 Minneapolis-St.Paul 4 
Seattle 4 Seattle 4 
Phoenix 3 Phoenix 3 
Boston 2 Dallas 1 
Denver 2 San Francisco 1 
Philadelphia 1 Los Angeles 0 
Tampa 1 New York 0 
Chicago 0 Philadelphia 0 
Cincinnati 0 Tampa 0 
Los Angeles 0 Washington 0 
Minneapolis-St.Paul 0 Chicago -1 
New York 0 Cincinnati -1 
San Francisco -1 Baltimore -2 
Washington -1 Pittsburgh -2 
Detroit -2 St. Louis -2 
Miami -3 Houston -3 
Cleveland -4 Atlanta -4 
Houston -4 Boston -4 
St. Louis -4 Detroit -4 
Dallas -8 Miami -5 
Atlanta -13 Cleveland -6 
Source - Compiled by author from Nationwide Personal Transportation Study 1995. 
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Table A-3
CUMULATIVE TRANSPORTATION ACHIEVEMENT
INDEX
Metropolitan Area CumulativeIndex
Growth
Pace
Portland 33 High
Pittsburgh 32 Low
Baltimore 27 Low
San Diego 26 High
Denver 16 High
Phoenix 13 High
Seattle 9 High
Washington 8 Moderate
Tampa 7 High
Cincinnati 6 Low
Minneapolis-St.Paul -1 Moderate
Miami -4 High
New York -5 Low
Philadelphia -5 Low
San Francisco -7 Moderate
Chicago -9 Low
St. Louis -9 Low
Houston -11 High
Los Angeles -11 High
Boston -15 Low
Cleveland -16 Low
Atlanta -24 High
Dallas -24 High
Detroit -36 Low
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APPENDIX B
Jobs-Housing Balance Case Study
Jobs-housing balance cannot be achieved when people cannot afford to live near where they work.  For
example, several metropolitan counties use moratoria to prevent rezonings that allow for high density
forms of housing such as condominiums, apartments, and small lots.  Others simply limit new
subdivisions to lots of very large size and homes of large finished areas.  Consider the case of one
suburban Atlanta county that routinely requires subdivision developers to build homes with a minimum
of 1,500 to 1,800 square feet on lots with a minimum of 12,000 to 18,000 square feet.  (There is no
constructive purpose in revealing the county's name since it is not alone.)  The rationale is that these
requirements assure that the county will attract higher end jobs and improve local employment conditions.
Table B-1 shows the house prices and incomes that result from such a policy in this county.
This presents two problems to home buyers.  First, very few public employees can afford to buy new
homes meeting the county's conditions.  For example, Table B-2 shows the percent of full time employees
of the county school district who presently own homes in county and those who could afford homes of
the kind routinely required by the case study county.  The new conditions are affordable to only 14
percent of the county's teachers.  Clearly, when local development conditions result in housing beyond
the reach of 85 percent of the county's school district employees, jobs-housing balance cannot be
achieved.  More commuting and associated air pollution is a consequence.
Second, what is the effect of such "exclusionary" housing practices on the ability of local labor to live in
the very county in which they work?  Using the county's own comprehensive plan as a guide, it appears
from Table B-3 that only 15 percent of the households supported by new jobs projected to be created
in this county between 1990 and 2010 would be able to afford to live in it.
The result of exclusionary housing policies is a jobs-housing mismatch.  Thus, although the county is
growing in both jobs and housing, the percent of residents who can live and work in the county is actually
falling, as shown in Table B-4.  Two trends are immediately obvious.  First, the county has become a
bedroom community within the metropolitan area.  Second, more people commute into the county than
live and work there.  Obviously, if people who work in the county cannot afford to live there, commuting
increases and so must traffic congestion and air pollution.
Table B-1
HOUSE PRICES AND INCOME REQUIRED OF
TYPICAL COUNTY REZONINGS
Lot
Size
House
Size
House
Price
Income Required
[County Median
= $55,000]
12,000 1,500 $180,800 $63,300
18,000 1,800 $230,200 $80,600
Source:  Growth Management Analysts, Inc., 1999.
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Table B-2
PERCENT OF SCHOOL EMPLOYEES ABLE
TO AFFORD HOMES BASED ON COUNTY CONDITIONS
Consideration Figure
Full time school district employees (approximate). 1,5001
Percent of full time employees owning homes in the case study
county. 50%2
Percent of employees able to afford homes in subject county based on
typical rezoning standards. 14%3
Notes:
1. Based on analysis of local school district budget and wages, fiscal year ending 1997.  The median
income, which included administrators, is about $30,000.
2. Based on comparison of county school district employees to the county property tax digest, fiscal year
ending 1997.  Others may own homes in other counties.
3. Estimated based on reported salaries plus a multiplier of 1.51 to reflect average workers per household
from 1990 Census, plus 20 percent to account for inflation and other income such as temporary or
supplemental employment. 
Table B-3
COUNTY EMPLOYMENT INCOMES AND
HOUSING AFFORDABILITY
Sector
Estimated
Household
Income1
New Jobs
Projected
1990-2010
Can Afford
County?2
Construction $39,370 216 NO
Manufacturing $38,256 2,498 NO
Transportation, Communications,
Utilities $50,717 1,078 YES
Wholesale $58,307 58 YES
Retail $17,426 1,595 NO
Finance, Insurance,
Real Estate $39,333 821 NO
Services $27,492 677 NO
Total $33,379 7,556 15% [1,136]
Notes:
1. Annualized labor income from County Business Patterns 1995 for county, multiplied by 1.51 workers
per household (based on 1990 Census figures) plus 10 percent to adjust for 1998 dollars. 
2. YES means household income plus 20 percent (for miscellaneous incomes or higher downpayments)
is sufficient to afford the minimum home in the referenced development alternative, and assumes that
all workers in the employment category are able to afford homes based on the county's typical
development conditions.  NO assumes that all workers in the employment category are not able to
afford homes based on the county's typical development conditions.
Table B-4
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COUNTY COMMUTING CHARACTERISTICS
1980 - 1990
Characteristics
Percent
Change
1980 1990
Workers 16+ 16,273 29,845 83.4%
Drove Alone 72.0 81.7 13.5%
Carpool 23.5 14.0 -40.4%
Public Transit 1.0 0.4 -60.0%
Worked Outside 53.8 70.4 30.9%
Worked Inside 46.2 29.6 -35.9%
County Employment 10,534 19,012 80.5%
Employees Commuting 3,016 10,178 337.5%
Source:  Adapted from County Comprehensive Plan supplemented with 1980 and 1990 Census data.
"Worked Inside" is total minus "Worked Outside."
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APPENDIX C
Issues of Governance
This appendix reviews five issues of governance that help provide some understanding of what we know
and do not know about governance alternatives.  The five issues are: (1) efficiency of service delivery; (2)
efficiency of scale; (3) equity; (4) accountability and responsiveness; and (5) political participation.  The
following is adapted substantially from Kathryn A. Foster, author of Governance in Erie County: A Foundation
for Understanding (Buffalo, NY: Institute for Local Government and Regional Growth, 1996).
Efficiency of Delivery
Virtually every taxpayer and policymaker wants efficiency; few, at least, would consistently prefer
inefficiency to efficiency.   Efficiency is based on two basic criteria:
< Goods and services are provided in the quantity and quality that people want; and
< Goods and services are produced at the lowest possible cost.
Efficiency is thus more than a simple measure of cost or consumer preferences.  Rather, it is a measure
of value, or colloquially, "bang for the buck."  The criteria for efficiency yield two types of inefficiency.
The first occurs when goods and services are not what consumers demand, even if they are produced at
lowest possible cost.  Using scarce resources to produce goods for which there is little demand -- whether
manual typewriters, six-lane highways, or senior housing near the airport -- is inefficient even if their
production is at lowest possible cost.
The second type of inefficiency occurs when the goods and services produced match consumer demands,
but production of these items does not occur at lowest possible cost.  Although residents and businesses
may demand and receive high quality, twice-a-week garbage pickup, for example, service is inefficient if
labor or equipment practices are wasteful, leading to higher-than-necessary costs for garbage services.
Review of the theory and evidence on efficiency can be divided into two areas:  1) the relative efficiency
of public versus private sector service delivery; and 2) within the public sector, the relative efficiency of
centralized (regional) versus decentralized (politically fragmented) local government arrangements.  
Efficiency of Delivery:  Public versus Private Sector Service Delivery
What do theory and practice tell us about the relative efficiency of public and private sector providers?
Theory suggests that private service producers, or, more specifically, profit-seeking producers, have the
greatest incentives to achieve efficiency in service delivery.  This is because private corporations more
than public or nonprofit corporations tend to operate under conditions of competition and client
accountability.  The greatest profits go to those who maximize the difference between the price a
consumer is willing to pay for a product and the cost of producing it.  Because buyers in a competitive
economy can choose between many producers, there is a great incentive to minimize costs and maximize
consumer satisfaction -- the building blocks of efficiency. In addition, because in the private sector the
effects of inefficiency are highly concentrated -- typically only a small handful of owners stand to gain or
lose significantly -- private corporations will tend to be more rigorous in achieving efficiency.
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By contrast, public (and nonprofit) agencies generally lack the competitive pressure and profit incentive
to efficiently produce goods and services.  Municipal governments, for example, are often the only game
in town and often enjoy a monopoly on public service provision within their borders.  For dissatisfied
citizens, inducing gains in public sector efficiency requires either credible threats to leave the municipality
(analogous to brand switching in the private sector) or political pressure to unseat elected officials. That
the costs to move are high and public officials often survive citizen opposition, however, weakens the
incentives for a public sector agency to improve efficiency.  Moreover, because citizens are so numerous
and dispersed, they individually stand to lose or gain only slightly from any inefficient policy or efficient
improvement.  As a consequence, theory suggests that the intensity with which the general public insists
upon efficiency improvements and the public sector feels compelled to respond tends to be less than in
the private sector.
Theory does not guarantee, of course, that a private enterprise will be efficient (nor does it guarantee that
a public sector will not be efficient).  Theory does indicate that achieving efficiency requires competition
and accountability.  When these conditions are absent from a private market (as occurs with monopolies
or long term franchises) or represent in a public one (as occurs with interjurisdictional competition or
intense citizen scrutiny of government operations), the theoretical advantages of private enterprise and
disadvantages of public sector are diminished.
Before considering the evidence, it is important to note that comparing the public and private sectors is
problematic because these sectors may have different goals for service provision.  Where the private
sector wishes to receive the highest monetary return for investment, the public sector is more concerned
about nonmonetary issues.
To measure efficiency requires information on consumer preferences, the cost of production inputs, and
the quality and quantity of production outputs.  For example, efficiency measures in education might be
test scores per dollar spent, while efficiency in fire protection might be measured by property damage or
response times in relation to costs.
In practice, because comparable data for these measures are difficult to come by,  determining efficiency
is difficult.  Not surprisingly, empirical research on the comparative efficiency of various governance
arrangements is actually scant, even though numerous articles imply such analysis.  Most research more
precisely focuses on the one aspect of efficiency for which data are readily available, namely the per capita
costs of service delivery.
With this consideration in mind, consider the findings of a comprehensive literature review by John D.
Donahue (1991) on the efficiency outcomes of public and private sector service delivery:
< Studies confirm the efficiency-inducing effects of competition and accountability. Provided
there exist competition or a credible threat of losing customers through contract nonrenewal,
private, profit-seeking agencies are potentially more efficient providers of services.
< In particular, studies of garbage collection, water utilities, electric utilities, office cleaning,
firefighting, and transportation (airlines, railroads, buses) found that private providers were
more efficient under conditions of competition and accountability. (Donahue, 1991; Spann,
1977).
< Notably, though, in several instances public provision was more efficient than private
provision, even under competitive market conditions (Donahue, 1991).  There were several
possible explanations.  First, in some cases private competitive firms may be too small to
capture economies of scale in production or billing.  Second, private firms may get away with
higher prices by taking advantage of the fact that many consumers are unwilling or unable to
shop around for the least expensive private provider. Third, despite competition, there is
likely to be some duplication and waste when multiple private providers provide garbage
pickup, water, firefighting or other services in a single neighborhood or area.  Fourth,
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networks of private competitors may in reality be more like private cartels that maintain high
prices throughout an industry.  A classic example of the latter is commercial garbage
collection cartels that operate in some regions.
< More specifically, publicly monitored private contracts, that is, privatization, is consistently
more efficient than either public provision or competitive private provision in garbage
collection and firefighting services (studies in Donahue, 1991).  Competition and
accountability may be ensured by competitive bidding and municipal monitoring and
enforcement of privatization contracts. The knowledge that a contract will not be renewed
if service does not meet consumer demands appears to impel private contractors to reduce
inefficiency.
  
< There appears to be no tendency for private water or electric utilities to be more efficient than
their public counterparts; in some instances, the public providers are more efficient for these
services (studies in Donahue, 1991).  Analysts suggest that these results are due at least in part
to the regulation of the profits of private utilities, which leads to higher than normal
investment in relatively expensive capital equipment.
Efficiency of Scale:  Centralized versus Decentralized Local Government Arrangements
A second topic of interest with respect to the efficiency effects of local government structure focuses on
the degree of centralization or decentralization in local government arrangements.  Since the earliest days
of metropolitanization in the late 1800s, popular wisdom has held that politically fragmented metropolitan
regions are inefficient due to duplication of service and lack of coordination in service delivery.   Since1
the 1950s a contrasting perspective has emerged that advances the opposite argument, namely that
politically fragmented metropolitan regions with many competing jurisdictions are, like competitive private
markets, more efficient than centralized, single provider arrangements.  
This debate over the relationship between government arrangements and efficiency persists in part
because each viewpoint has theoretical support.  Bolstering the "politically decentralized arrangements
are more efficient" view are economic principles related to consumer preferences and interjurisdictional
competition.  Bolstering the "one or a few large governments are more efficient" view are the principles
of economies of scale and externalities.
 
Argument 1: Politically decentralized governance is more efficient.  One source of support for the view
that politically decentralized governance is more efficient is the principle that the closer the match
between individual consumer demand and actual services delivered, the more efficient the service
delivery.   The more homogenous a jurisdiction, then, with respect to service preferences, the greater the2
potential for achieving efficiency.  Because individuals vary, no community is entirely homogeneous with
respect to preferences for particular services, of course.  It is likely, however, that smaller communities
will have a smaller gap between individual preferences and the jurisdiction's actual service offerings than
will large communities.  Small communities are simply more likely to be homogeneous with respect to
preferences, especially if residents are able to "self-sort" themselves into communities. 
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Note that it is diversity of preferences, not size per se, that matters.  There is no inherent efficiency
advantage to smaller communities.  To the extent small communities are internally diverse with respect
to preferences, the efficiency advantages of decentralization are diminished.  Likewise, if large
communities are homogeneous with respect to preferences, the efficiency disadvantages of centralization
are diminished.
The greater likelihood of interjurisdictional competition in politically decentralized metropolitan regions
provides a second theoretical support.  Competition is well-known to compel efficiency.  To the extent
that political officials believe taxpayers/voters will express dissatisfaction about local services by migrating
to another community, officials will strive to improve public sector performance.  Government officials
have a strong incentive to root out inefficiency in public service delivery.
The theoretical efficiency advantage of politically decentralized areas rests on the notions that competition
between jurisdictions is more likely and taxpayer threats to move are more credible in areas with multiple
jurisdictions.  Under a regional government, which by definition limits relocation choices, there is virtually
no jurisdictional competition and, because moving out of the jurisdiction requires moving out of the
region, citizen threats to relocate are far less credible.  On grounds of competition and preferences, then,
theory favors politically fragmented regions over those with integrated government arrangements.  
Argument 2: Politically centralized governance is more efficient.  Economies of scale criteria imply that
small units of government cannot achieve lowest cost service provision because they sacrifice the cost
savings associated with large-scale production.    Economies of scale are especially relevant for capital-3
intensive services, such as water, sewer, and mass transit, and for administrative tasks, such as vital
statistics or property recordkeeping.  Once again, there is no guarantee that large units are more efficient.
Large units may suffer from diseconomies of scale, that is, be too large for cost-effective service delivery.
For example, a large regional sewer agency might sacrifice efficiency by attempting to serve remote areas
or because of slack in a large bureaucracy.
A second argument favoring the efficiency of large-scale units of government concerns externalities,
which are also known as spillovers or third-party effects.  Externalities are impacts (either positive or
negative) imposed by one party on another without any mechanism for the impact-generating party to
compensate the affected party.  Examples of externalities are air pollution, water pollution, traffic
congestion, or the benefits of a central city zoo, all of which may be generated by the actions of one
jurisdiction or person and experienced by other jurisdictions or persons.  Externalities lead to inefficiency
because the preferences of affected parties are not accounted for when the impact-generating party makes
decisions about service delivery.  As a consequence, a jurisdiction produces inefficiently large amounts
of a service that generates  negative externalities and inefficiently small amounts of a service that generates
positive ones.  
One traditional solution to externalities is to tailor the boundaries of jurisdictions so that they encompass
the entire territory affected by their decisions on public services, a process known as internalizing the
externality.  Matching political borders to service areas ensures that everyone affected will contribute
financially (through taxes) and have a political voice in service delivery decisions.
 
Unfortunately, the fact that externalities vary for different services complicates implementing the solution.
Services with strong externalities, such as major cultural facilities, pollution generating activities, or
airports, lend themselves to more regionalized government arrangements.  Services with weak
externalities, such as administrative tasks, curb ordinances, or a local tennis court, lend themselves to
more local control.  Some services, notably planning and public safety, have mixed externalities.
Depending on the particular task, the appropriate government level may vary.  Locating a region-serving
retail mall or pursuing criminals across borders, for example, are more amenable to regionalized decision-
making, while downtown sign ordinances and community policing patrols are well-suited to local control.
The presence of externalities, which differ for every service and function within services, implies that to
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achieve efficiency requires a variety of governing units, each geographically tailored to be most efficient
for a particular task.  The impracticality and unwieldiness of such a system, which could have hundreds
of different governments, has traditionally persuaded society to tolerate less than 100 percent
internalization of externalities and, thus, less than 100 percent efficiency.  
The practical problems associated with achieving efficiency given multiple services and fixed municipal
borders has motivated intermunicipal service agreements and formation of special-purpose governments.
Analysts agree that externalities (and also economies of scale and preference matching, though not
competition) can be theoretically addressed by cooperative arrangements or overlay governments, the
boundaries of which can be precisely tailored to encompass the efficient scales for a given service.  A
metropolitan region might establish, for example, a series of public authorities and special districts for
water, sewer, health, parks, libraries, housing, and highways services.  Likewise, two or more municipalities
might join forces to capture economies of scale or internalize an externality associated with a service.
Submunicipal, special-purpose governments can also satisfy specialized service preferences, much in the
same way that downtown business improvement districts enable a higher level of public safety and
maintenance services within a small area of a city.  
In theory, then, if service preference and competition factors outweigh economies of scale and
externalities considerations, then smaller decision units are most efficient.  If not, then more regionalized
governance arrangements are most efficient. Neither argument is inherently superior.  In practice, the
optimal arrangement will depend on resident preferences, the nature of services provided, the presence
and intensity of externalities, and the level of competition.
More so than studies on public versus private sector efficiency, empirical studies on local government
arrangements are essentially cost studies that measure the "buck" part of "bang for the buck".  In that
genre, there is a relatively large literature examining the link between local governance arrangements and
per capita costs of service delivery.  A review reveals several themes:
< The greater the number of multi-purpose governments in an area, the lower the amount of
government spending on services (Adams, 1965; Isserman, 1976; Sjoquist, 1982; Nelson,
1987; Schneider, 1989).  The preponderance of evidence indicates that competition between
jurisdictions drives down costs.  Apparently, the implied threat of outmigration by residents
or businesses and the desire to attract new residents and businesses prompts municipalities
to keep service costs low.
< For single-purpose governments, however, the greater the number of units in an area either
has no effect or leads to higher per capita costs for services these units provide (Nelson 1986;
Nelson 1987; Eberts and Gronberg, 1988).  There are several possible explanations.  First,
because special-purpose governments provide different functions, a multiplicity of these
entities does not guarantee the competition hypothesized to keep costs low; airport
authorities and library districts, for example, do not compete with one another.  Second, even
when multiple special-purpose governments do provide the same service in an area, the
possible erosion of economies of scale might outweigh cost reductions realized through
greater competition.  Third, because special-purpose governments often provide regional level
services such as transit or sewer, multiple special-purpose providers may sacrifice 
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economies of scale and thus sacrifice lower costs.  Fourth, managers of special-purpose
governments may capitalize on the likelihood that most customers will not relocate if
dissatisfied with a single service.  Fifth, institutional specialization itself requires higher
expenditures to cover the overhead and administrative costs of a separate government unit.
< Results are inconclusive with respect to whether fiscally centralized or decentralized areas
(measured by the share of higher-level government spending to total higher- and lower-level
government spending) spend more per capita for services. Some studies find that more
fiscally decentralized states have higher government expenditures (Nelson, 1986; Oates,
1985).  Others find the opposite (Giertz,  1981).  At the metropolitan scale, two studies yield
mixed results depending on the service  (Wagner and Weber,  1975; DiLorenzo,  1983); a
third found lower costs in areas that were more fiscally decentralized (Zax,  1989), while a
fourth found the opposite, that costs were lower in more regionalized areas (Dolan, 1990).
< At least at the national scale, competition apparently holds down the growth rate of
government expenditures over time (Marlow, 1988; Grossman, 1989; Lowery and Berry,
1983).  Results are inconclusive at the metropolitan scale (Schneider, 1986, 1989). 
< "Before and after" studies of metropolitan reorganizations reveal higher per capita costs for
regionalized services following consolidation (Gusteley, 1977; Cook, 1978; Benton and
Gamble, 1984).  In Miami-Dade County (Florida), Metropolitan Toronto, and Jacksonville-
Duval County (Florida), three areas that either formed two-tier federated governments or
underwent city-county consolidation, per capita costs increased for regionally provided
services (e.g., police and education), while there was no change in expenditures for locally
provided services (e.g., sanitation).  Higher costs were attributed in part to the "equalizing up"
phenomenon in which post-consolidation spending levels are set equal to the highest pre-
consolidation levels in individual jurisdictions prior to the reorganization. An alternative
explanation is that the purpose of city-county consolidation was not cost savings but rather
improved services, which tend to cost more.
< In short, studies on the cost effects of local government arrangements reinforce the
importance of competition as a brake on local government spending. The greater the number
of local governments in an area, the lower the per capita costs of service provision.  This
finding is reinforced by findings that greater concentration of spending power in higher level
governments is associated with higher government spending.  On cost grounds alone, it
appears that the benefits of consolidated government (economies of scale, externalities) are
outweighed by the drawbacks of large units of government (lack of competition, greater
barriers to public scrutiny of government costs).
Equity and Local Government Arrangements
A third area of interest is the relationship between the arrangement of local governments and various
measures of equity.  Questions of equity focus on the distribution of resources across groups by
neighborhood, race, age, gender, income class, and location within city, suburban, or rural area.  For
present purposes, equity refers to fairness in the incidence of taxes and distribution of public services. 
Equity is not equivalent to equality.  Few would expect absolute equality of tax payments or services
received by individuals or groups, given very different needs and preferences.  Equity is also not a
universally defined or static concept.  Not only do societies define what is fair in different ways, any single
society continually redefines its own conceptions of fairness over time.
Two measures of equity are most frequently used to evaluate policies: ability-to-pay and benefits received.
The ability-to-pay criterion holds that persons with equal ability to pay should pay equal taxes (a standard
known as horizontal equity), and persons with greater ability to pay should pay more taxes than those with
lesser ability (known as vertical equity).  Thus, two persons with equal incomes, regardless of place of
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residence, age, race, occupation or so forth, should pay equal taxes.  Within any jurisdiction or region,
vertical equity would require some form of redistribution or progressive taxing to ensure that those with
more resources pay more. 
The benefits criterion, sometimes referred to as fiscal equity, holds that persons should pay taxes or fees
in proportion to the services received.  That is, those who benefit pay; those who do not benefit, do not
pay.  Fiscal equity does not presume redistribution to accommodate different resources of the poor and
rich.
Because the two measures of equity are often contradictory, depending on which one is considered a
policy may appear to be equitable or inequitable.  Naturally, this complicates the assessment of equity.
If ability-to-pay is given greater weight, politically integrated regions are more likely to achieve horizontal
equity than are politically decentralized ones.  Given systems of local property taxation, there is a greater
probability that two persons or households with identical resources will pay the same in taxes if they live
in the same jurisdiction than if they live in different ones.  With respect to vertical equity, there is no
inherent advantage to either integrated or fragmented systems of governance.  In either case, vertical
equity requires fiscal policies that favor the poor.  To the extent that integrated governments have a larger
pool within which to draw funds and redistribute them according to progressive principles, however, most
analysts agree that politically integrated systems may have greater potential for vertical equity at the
metropolitan scale.4
If, by contrast, the benefits criterion of equity is given greater weight, achieving equity implies shifting
from collective taxing systems to user fees and charges based on actual services used.  This shift puts
proportionally greater financial responsibility on those who receive relatively large amounts of public
services, regardless of whether the government is regional or municipal.  Because the poor typically
receive large amounts of public services, often at considerable subsidy, the benefits criterion represents
a potentially large threat to their well-being.  Only to the extent that benefits principles are relaxed
somewhat and used to justify collective funding for regionwide cultural or recreational institutions
previously funded only by central city residents (who may have disproportionately high poverty rates)
would regional government hold fiscal advantage for poorer households.  
Another dimension of equity relates to the degree of disparity or standardization in service levels.  By this
criterion, the most socially equitable system would be one in which service disparities are most narrow.
Theory suggests that centralized governance arrangements are more likely to achieve social equity than
are decentralized ones.  The reasoning is straightforward:  decentralized arrangements imply variations
across jurisdictions in tax burdens, taxable resources, and service levels.  If the entire area is a single
government, there is by design a single tax base and uniform tax rate for all residents. 
To the extent that equity is influenced by planning and zoning laws, moreover, politically decentralized
metropolitan areas would be expected to have higher levels of social, racial, and economic differentiation
than would politically centralized areas.  Through planning and zoning, a community has the legal power
to insulate itself from outsiders it considers undesirable, promote its social values and community
character, and ensure through devices such as minimum lot sizes that newcomers pay their fair share in
property taxes.  Given that each local government unit has planning and zoning powers, we would expect
to find higher levels of segregation in politically decentralized metropolitan areas that have relatively small,
demographically homogeneous jurisdictions.  To the extent that economic, racial, or social integration is
an equity-related goal for a region, politically integrated governance holds greater promise.
Although these arguments give preference to politically integrated metropolitan areas on equity grounds,
there is no reason why decentralized systems could not achieve high levels of tax or service equity in
practice.  National, state, or regional systems of tax base sharing or grant equalization (in which the areas
with the lowest tax bases or highest needs receive the largest grants) can be designed to redistribute wealth
or aid to better equalize fiscal capacity.  In addition, services for which a relatively standardized level of
service or access to service are deemed important may be provided by the county or higher unit of
government, which enables the pooling of resources from area jurisdictions.  Such an arrangement often
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occurs for social services such as public assistance and health, for which service equity is considered
critical.
Most equity studies examine socioeconomic and/or racial segregation in politically decentralized
metropolitan regions.  These studies do not analyze similar patterns of segregation in politically
consolidated regions (although some studies compare segregation within municipalities), so conclusions
about local government structure are thwarted.  Other studies examine pre- and post-consolidation
standardization of service levels.  Overall, empirical studies rarely address equity in centralized versus
decentralized arrangements.
With these considerations in mind, studies show that:
< Political fragmentation of fiscal systems and planning laws facilitate segregation at the
jurisdiction level (Danielson, 1976; Miller, 1981; Logan and Schneider, 1981; Weiher, 1991;
Rusk, 1993).  Political fragmentation allows persons to differentiate themselves by certain
demographic characteristics into discrete and autonomous government units.  Differences
tend to be greater across jurisdiction boundaries than across informal neighborhood
boundaries.
< Variation in income levels across jurisdictions increases as the number of jurisdictions in an
area increases (Hill 1974). Such differentiation may result both from exclusionary laws and
behaviors and also from individual residential choices within the metropolis.
< City to suburb per capita income ratios are lower in metropolitan areas with "inelastic"
boundaries than in areas with "elastic" boundaries (Rusk, 1993). Elasticity refers to the ability
of a central city to capture surrounding suburban areas through annexation or other means.
Thus, areas with more expansive central cities, which tend to be more politically integrated,
have narrower income gaps between the central city and suburbs than do areas with less
expansive central cities, which tend to be more politically fragmented. To the extent that city-
suburban differences are a measure of equity, politically integrated arrangements are superior
means toward equity.
< Per capita spending for services tends to vary widely across jurisdictions (Paddison,   1983).
Interpreting public service disparities requires caution, however.  Given that persons have
different service preferences and needs, variation is expected and well-accepted.  Variations
are also evident  within jurisdictions.
< Within municipalities, per capita spending on services tends to be higher in low income areas
compared to high income areas (Rich, 1982; Lineberry,  1977).  Contrary to popular wisdom,
studies suggest that low-income areas do not receive lower levels of public services.  The
finding is understandable from a service need viewpoint:  poor, high-crime areas are likely to
receive higher levels of social and public safety services than are affluent, low-crime areas.
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< In Toronto, transfer of education, police, infrastructure, and social services to an upper-tier,
regional level of government helped narrow intermunicipal fiscal and service disparities within
the region (Frisken, 1993; Cook, 1973; Feldman, 1995).
Accountability, Responsiveness and Local Government Arrangements
Conventional wisdom holds that small government units are more accountable and responsive to
residents and businesses than are larger units.  The notion, often trumpeted by opponents of metropolitan
government or service consolidation, is that big government equates to big bureaucracy, which equates
to diminished accountability and responsiveness to citizen concerns.  
Responsiveness can be measured by the match between citizen preferences, on the one hand, and actual
policy and service outcomes, on the other.  Accountability, defined as the extent to which public officials
are answerable to constituents, is difficult to measure, although one might argue that in practice
unaccountable public officials are more likely than accountable ones to be turned out of office by
dissatisfied constituents.
Some of the same theoretical considerations discussed in the context of efficiency also pertain to the
questions of responsiveness and accountability.  This is understandable, given that one dimension of
efficiency is providing people with the goods they desire, which is itself a measure of responsiveness.  
There are two sides to the theoretical debate over the responsiveness advantages of different governance
arrangements.  On one side is the argument that decentralized government arrangements are superior to
politically integrated arrangements in terms of accountability and responsiveness.  By this reasoning, the
fear that citizens or businesses will "vote with their feet" in a politically decentralized system to obtain a
preferable public service package prompts governments to heed closely the wishes of their constituents.
Because the threat of exit is credible only where municipal options are plentiful, politically decentralized
arrangements are more likely to achieve political responsiveness.  
On the other side is the argument that politically integrated governance arrangements provide clearer lines
of citizen accountability and accessibility than do more complex decentralized arrangements.  By serving
as a place for "one-stop complaints" integrated governments are less able and apt to pass the buck and
so may achieve greater responsiveness and accountability.  A multiplicity of governments, by contrast, is
considered more difficult to monitor and hold accountable.  
Researchers encounter two types of problems in examining the link between local government
arrangements and government responsiveness and accountability.  The first is the difficulty separating the
effects of jurisdiction size per se from the related but distinct effects of integrated versus decentralized
local government arrangements.  The second problem is devising a measure for responsiveness.  In the
former case, research designed to compare responsiveness for persons living under two different types
of local government systems can disentangle the effects of political structure as opposed to jurisdiction
size.  In the latter case, analysts tend to substitute consumer satisfaction as a proxy for the more elusive
concepts of responsiveness and accountability. 
Unfortunately, consumer satisfaction studies focus on individuals within a single jurisdiction, rather than
those living in different places.  We know of only one study that examines consumer satisfaction levels
across places distinguished by local government arrangements.  The study, by W.E. Lyons, David Lowery,
and Ruth Hoogland DeHoog (1992), compares service satisfaction levels for persons living in carefully
matched neighborhoods in Louisville, Kentucky, a politically decentralized metropolitan region, and
Lexington-Fayette County, Kentucky, a consolidated city-county metropolitan area.  The findings of that
study indicate that:
< Local government arrangements are only weakly related to service satisfaction levels.  More
important than these arrangement are a variety of factors related to service levels, personal
characteristics, and, the researchers speculate, historical events and the quality of local
leadership.  
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< There is, however, an indirect link between service satisfaction and local government
arrangements.  Citizens in politically consolidated areas were more satisfied with services than
were citizens of localities in the decentralized system.  This relationship was driven primarily
by the higher number of services provided by the larger regional government.  
Participation and Local Government Arrangements
An important question for democratic societies is how local government arrangements may influence
levels of political participation.  Participation comes in many forms, from voting, which is considered a
relatively passive and minor level of involvement, to stronger levels of involvement such as attending
public hearings, contacting public officials, joining or running community organizations, and serving as
an elected or appointed public official.  
There are large theoretical and empirical literatures on citizen participation.  Much of these literatures
address the pros and cons of participatory government, trends in participation over time, at what levels
participation takes place, and the conditions for extensive participation in government.  The last of these
is of greatest interest to analysts of local government arrangements.  What is the link between political
structure and  participation?
The conventional view is that small-scale democracy is most conducive to participation.  As a
consequence, small towns in which citizens know one another and their leaders are thought to be best-
suited for extensive participation in government.  The much-heralded New England town meeting
remains an ideal form of democratic government to many, and a rhetorically valuable model for
supporters of small government.  
Without denying the importance of participation at the local scale, community-level participation cannot
solve important problems of wider societal significance.  For such problems, these analysts argue, the
greater resources and broader outlook of a larger-scale government are necessary for effective
participation.  National level organizations and interest groups apparently succeed at prompting numerous
citizens to participate in government.
  
Neither of these lines of reasoning addresses directly the question of whether participation is greatest in
politically integrated or politically decentralized government arrangements.  The most pertinent theoretical
analyses are found in studies concerned with responses to dissatisfaction with government.  This line of
reasoning argues that people may exercise any one of four approaches to expressing dissatisfaction, two
of which are considered active forms of participation.  Active forms are "exit" (leaving the jurisdiction
or opting for private services rather than public offerings) and "voice" (attending meetings, contacting
officials, organizing petitions, and so forth).  Passive forms of participation are "loyalty" (tolerating
inferior government programs or policies and trusting public officials to work things out) and "neglect"
(disregarding the community, ignoring public issues, and giving up on government's ability to work things
out).  
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As noted in the discussion on efficiency, exit options are most available in politically decentralized
metropolitan regions.  To exit a politically integrated metropolis requires leaving the region altogether.
Such constraints might be thought to induce higher levels of voice, loyalty, or neglect, however the precise
theoretical link is unclear. 
Reflecting the focus of the theoretical literature, empirical studies tend to focus on the relationship
between personal characteristics, neighborhood attributes, and government size and levels of
participation, rather than on the link between participation and local government arrangements.
Surprisingly little is known, although findings on government size and participation shed some light and
are thus of interest.  In addition, the previously cited study by Lyons, Lowery and DeHoog examined
levels of participation and feelings of political efficacy in Louisville and Lexington (KY) metropolitan
areas.
Among the findings of these studies are that:
< There is no definitive answer to the question of whether there is an optimal size of
government for political participation (Berry, Portney, and Thomson,  1993; Dahl and Tufte,
1973).  At least at the national level, the size of a country is not correlated with levels of
political participation.  
< Demographic characteristics do not account for different levels of participation in community
organizations (Berry, Portney, and Thomson, 1993).  A study of citizen participation in 15
U.S. cities found that communities with low socio-economic status did not have significantly
different participation rates from communities of high socio-economic status.
< Regardless of levels of political participation, residents of politically integrated government
systems are more knowledgeable about which services are provided by their local government
than are residents of jurisdictions in fragmented systems (Lyons, Lowery and DeHoog,
1992).  Despite the argument that large-scale governance will by its size alone be more
confusing to citizens, evidence suggests that consolidated government is more understandable
to citizens than is a system comprised of municipal, county, and special-purpose
governments.  This finding is not surprising, given that a consolidated government may be
the only government of consequence in an area.
< Residents of politically fragmented local government arrangements are slightly more likely to
consider exit as a means of expressing dissatisfaction with government than are residents of
politically integrated regions (Lyons, Lowery and DeHoog, 1992).  Such a finding is expected,
given the greater options for exit in decentralized government arrangements.
< Residents of consolidated systems are more attached to their communities than are residents
of fragmented systems (Lyons, Lowery and DeHoog, 1992).  Attachment was defined as a
measure related to how pleased or disappointed a person would be to leave the community.
Participation was positively associated with voice and loyalty forms of participation, thus
suggesting that persons in  consolidated areas are more likely to participate.  This may, of
course, be related to the fact that exit options are attenuated under a integrated metropolitan
area. 
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APPENDIX D
Governance Arrangements and Metropolitan Economic Development
A growing literature addresses the link between the structure of governance at the metropolitan level and
income growth (Foster,  1993; Nelson, 1990; Ward, 1987).  In this appendix the relationship between
metropolitan governance structures and the economic well-being of individuals is considered. 
Literature indicates that metropolitan governance structure may affect choices by households, firms, and
developers.  Because government arrangements may influence the type and quantity of services, facilities,
and amenities in an area, they may also influence residential and commercial location and investment
decisions (Danielson and Doig, 1982).  Little consensus exists, however, about how metropolitan
governance structure may affect economic development, which is defined here as change in personal per
capita income because, after all, it is the welfare of the individual that ought to be the ultimate objective
of any governance arrangement.  Three schools of thought contend for dominance in the debate over
how to structure metropolitan governance may influence growth in per capita personal income:  centrists,
polycentrists, and regionalists.
Centrist Perspectives 
Centrists argue that large, multiple-purpose governments are most efficient in administration and
production.  Potential investors are repelled by multiple layers of government, confusing lines of
authority, duplication of service, and the transaction costs of interacting with multiple small units of
government (Committee for Economic Development, 1970; Ward, 1987).  Regional governments,
centrists allege, are best suited to internalize the externalities of growth (especially congestion) and realize
economies of scale in service delivery (Rusk,  1993, 1996; Wingo,  1972).  Centralized systems can draw
upon a larger pool of human, material, and financial resources, and offer a wider variety of services to
residents and businesses than can governance systems comprised of relatively small, resource-limited,
sometimes part-time-staffed municipalities (Felbinger,  1984; Frisken, 1991).
Centrists are especially critical of interjurisdictional competition, which they contend promotes zero- or
negative-sum games, leads to inefficiently and inequitably located facilities, encourages haphazard
development and overzoning of commercial and industrial land uses, and induces local governments to
relax environmental standards (Barlow, 1991; Hanson, 1974; Netzer, 1991; Oates and Schwab, 1988;
Peirce, 1993).  Centralized governments, in contrast, can better rationalize metropolitan wide
development, narrow intraregional disparities, and spur investment in central city revitalization (Downs,
1994; Lewis,  1996; Mattoon,  1996; Orfield, 1997; Pastor, et al., 1997).
To investors, regulatory consistency, a professionalized bureaucracy, and the fewer interactions with large,
central governments relative to multiple, smaller ones speeds projects, reduces frustration, and lowers
development risks, all of which attract economic investment (Barlow, 1991; Cox and Nartowicz, 1980;
Lind,  1997; Ward,  1987).  Regional government attracts developers for whom the benefits of one-stop
shopping outweigh the costs of uniform and monopolistic public service.  The higher odds of dominating
policy choices in a large heterogeneous jurisdiction rather than in a small homogenous, less fiercely
participatory one may also draw developers to centralized governments (Lewis,  1996).
Polycentrist Perspectives 
In contrast, polycentrists argue that politically fragmented governance systems are superior to centralized
ones for attracting economic growth.  Drawing upon the public choice and local political economy views
of metropolitan political structure (Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR),  1987;
Mueller,  1989), polycentrists argue that a system with many local governments offers firms and residents
greater choice among service/tax bundles and therefore a greater probability of finding a close match for
their service/tax preferences (Bish,  1971; Boyne,  1996; Ostrom, Tiebout, and Warren, 1961; Tiebout,
1956).  The driving force is interjurisdictional competition, which polycentrists view as essential for
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ensuring customers the quantity, quality, and cost of services they demand (Dye, 1990; Kenyon, 1997;
Nunn, Klacik, and Schoedel, 1996; Schneider, 1989).  Multiple, overlapping governments signal not chaos
or inefficiency, polycentrists contend, but, rather, responsiveness to heterogeneous demands and
recognition that different urban services achieve efficient production levels at different scales (ACIR,
1987; DeTorres, 1972; Honey, 1976; Parks and Oakerson, 1989).
To investors, polycentric systems may be attractive because they facilitate playing one community off
against the other to obtain tax breaks, offer lenient environmental regulations, and provide other
economic inducements unlikely in a less competitive setting (Breton, 1991; Kenyon and Kincaid, 1991;
Oates,  1990; Van Dyne, 1997).   The one-size-fits-all model of regional government yields a public service
monopoly, which polycentrists fault for lacking competitive incentives to operate efficiently, strike a
bargain favorable to potential investors, or satisfy the needs of  a heterogeneous customer base for
tailored service packages.  Polycentric systems also attract investment because they offer development
capitalists, economic elites, and large businesses shields against the redistributive policies typical of
regionalized systems (Cox and Nartowicz, 1980; Danielson,  1976; Logan and Molotch,  1987; Orfield,
1997). 
Regionalist Perspectives 
Rising above the centrist-polycentrist fray is a third school of thought represented by regionalists who
contend that the number, size, or arrangements of local governments are relatively incidental when dealing
with regional issues.  Of primary concern is the role of metropolitan governance structures in making
decisions on issues of regional significance (Dodge,  1996; Orfield,  1997; Yaro and Hiss,  1996).  Regional
governance structures have authority over allocation of one or more resources everyone in the region
needs to sustain economy activity. Water, wastewater treatment and disposal, port management, airport
management, flood control, and air pollution control, among other functions, generally operate best at
the regional scale (Adams,  1997; Bollens, 1997).  To regionalists, even nominally regional governments,
such as Unigov in Indianapolis (composed of Marion County and the city of Indianapolis) or New York
City (composed of five burroughs), are part of a larger regional governance system that needs such
overarching decisionmaking mechanisms to achieve regional effectiveness (Hollis,  1998).
The attractiveness of regional governance systems to households, firms, and developers rests primarily
on the assurance that regional concerns such as water, economic development, airports, and transit, will
receive regional consideration.  Also attractive is that regional governance systems that downplay the
underlying local government structure frees residents and businesses from divisive jurisdictional battles
over service levels and the political turmoil of government reform proposals.   
Regionalists further argue that because regional outcomes are politically difficult to achieve and require
sustained collaborations, regional governance itself signals that the region is committed to making
regionalism work despite the barriers (Nunn and Rosentraub,  1997).  The commitment to metropolitan
governance thus attracts particularly large corporate interests that have a long history of support for
regionalized governance (Foster, 1997a; Teaford, 1979; Wallis, 1995).
There is finally the argument simply that regionalization of local public services can increase a
metropolitan area's wealth.  Using theoretical gaming, McAndrews and Voith (1993) observe that when
individuals and firms act in their self interest, they do not bear directly the costs of congestion they
impose on others.  Local governments likewise acting in their own self interest will impose costs
(externalities) on others.  The region's wealth and by implication the incomes of individuals suffer.  Either
by itself or more likely through coordination among different providers, a regional authority can improve
the distribution of economic activity when compared to a region without such an authority or a region
composed of only local governments.  This seems to be the heart of the regionalist view.
Past Empirical Evidence
Empirical evidence from case studies, business surveys, and aggregate analyses yields few conclusions
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linking metropolitan governance structures and economic growth.  For example, Feiock and Carr (1997)
found no relationship between city-county consolidation effects of the 1973 Jacksonville/Duval County
(Florida) consolidation and growth of manufacturing, retail, and services. Owen and Willbern (1985)
found that Unigov, formed by the consolidation of the City of Indianapolis and Marion County (Indiana),
was associated positively with economic growth (see also Blomquist and Parks,  1995).  The extent to
which the Unigov structure itself accounts for these changes is difficult to assess given implementation
of a host of economic development tools, including tax abatements, enterprise zones, and tax-increment
financing, since consolidation.  Durning’s (1995) analyses of the 1991 consolidation of the City of Athens
and Clarke County (Georgia) indicate that high pre-consolidation expectations for economic growth
disappeared thirty months later but it is much too early to assess effects on the local economy.
More consistent are survey findings, which reveal strong support among business and community elites
for regional government (for example, Crosby and Bryson, 1995; Greer, 1963; Henderson and
Rosenbaum,  1973; Lyons,  1977; Teaford,  1979).  At least at the metropolitan scale, the potential for
one-stop permitting is apparently more attractive to business interests than is the opportunity to play one
community off against another.  For many elites, support for regional government stems from their
perception that centralized structures foster economic growth.  Corroborating evidence is offered by
Edwards and Bohland (1991), who found a strong link between support for economic growth and
consolidation proposals in Virginia.  Persons with favorable attitudes toward economic growth tended
to support city-county consolidation; those who preferred slow economic growth tended to oppose
consolidation.  Regardless of whether government consolidation actually does promote growth, then, the
popular perception is that it will. 
In contrast, a study of likely voters in Santa Clara County, California, found that support for regional
government is strong among persons concerned with the negative effects of growth such as traffic
congestion and pollution (Gerston and Haas, 1993).  To the extent that social, economic, and
environmental problems have passed some threshold of dissatisfaction, residents indicate support for
regional mechanisms to manage issues affecting the regional quality of life.  A survey of citizens in
consolidated Lexington-Fayette County and the politically decentralized Louisville metropolitan area in
Kentucky found the same or higher levels of satisfaction with urban service delivery and government
institutions among citizens in the regionalized metropolis relative to the decentralized one (Lyons, Lowery,
and DeHoog,  1992).  Whether such satisfaction would translate into higher income is not clear.
Evidence from aggregate studies is also ambiguous.  Rusk (1993, 1996) finds that metropolitan regions
with "elastic" central cities (those exhibiting increases in land area and population between 1950 and 1990)
grew faster in population and manufacturing employment, and had higher bond ratings on average than
did regions with "inelastic" central cities.  Rusk reports that politically integrated metropolitan regions had
consistently higher growth rates between 1950 and 1990.  A more sophisticated treatment of Rusk’s
elasticity hypothesis found support for the link between metropolitan population growth and elasticity,
but only weak evidence linking elasticity to metropolitan economic welfare (Blair, Staley, and Zhang,
1996). 
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New Empirical Evidence
Recent work by Nelson and Foster (1999) casts new empirical light on the relationship between
metropolitan governance structures and growth in personal per capita income in U.S. metropolitan areas.
Their analysis examines changes between 1976 and 1996 in personal per capita income among the 287
largest metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) considering measures of governance representing each school
of thought, after accounting for a variety of factors.  The analysis suggests that the centrist and regionalist
schools are mostly right but there is little empirical support for the polycentrist school.  A review of their
work can be instructive to the overall debate waging in metropolitan Atlanta.  This is done first through
a review of governance factors, then through a summary of their empirical findings, and finally through
some generalizable conclusions.
Governance Factors
Broadly speaking, governance factors fall into two categories: local and regional.
Local governance factor.  Within metropolitan areas, governance is provided by central cities, suburban
cities, counties, townships, and special service districts.  Consider central  cities first.  Given post second-
world-war trends, metropolitan growth has occurred mostly at the cost of central cities' share of
metropolitan population and central city per capital personal income has lagged.  Central cities, though,
have considerable resources that can be marshalled for a variety of purposes.  Those resources are
frustrated if central cities are unable to expand territory to keep pace with growth, which Rusk (1993,
1996) calls "central city elasticity."
Rusk (1993, 1996) and later Blair, Staley and Zhang (1996) show that metropolitan areas with elastic
central cities enjoy higher per capita incomes than areas with inelastic central cities.  We capture the
essence of these phenomena with two variables.  The first is central city dominance which is defined as
the percent of the MSA population residing in the central city in a base year (see Foster,  1993).  The
second is a measure of central city elasticity which is defined as the ratio of central city population in 1980
to 1960 divided by the ratio of land area in 1980 to 1960.  An inelastic city will have a low elasticity score,
perhaps negative but in any event around 0.   A city that adds population but not land area during this1
period probably already had the land it needed in which to grow so its ratio will be above 0.   A city that2
added both population and land will also have a ratio higher than 0.   A negative association with per3
capita income growth is expected with respect to central city dominance because its income growth will
lag behind the metropolitan area as a whole but a positive association is expected with respect to elasticity
since it indicates the extent to which the central city is able to keep pace with metropolitan growth.  These
expectations are consistent with the centrist view.
Do higher percentages of people living outside central cities stimulate or dampen income growth? It
depends on whether they live in unincorporated areas or suburban municipalities, and in municipalities
it depends on how big they are.  The polycentrist view is that metropolitan areas with relatively high
proportions of unincorporated population (more political integration) will have lower income growth than
areas that are more fully incorporated in a large number of competing municipalities (Foster,  1993).
Consistent with the polycentrist view, a negative association is expected between unincorporated
population percent and income growth.
In contrast, centrists would argue that few, larger suburban general purpose governments are preferable
to many, smaller ones because larger cities are better able to provide services efficiently.  
66
Consistent with their view, a positive association is expected between suburban municipality size and
income growth.  While consistent with the centrist view that larger is better, this association could also
be consistent with the polycentrist view since it recognizes the benefits of multiple municipal general
purpose governments within metropolitan areas.
The influence of special districts on income growth must also be considered.  There are two kinds of
special districts to consider.  The first are those that have single service provision purposes such as water,
wastewater, drainage, fire, and mosquito control services.  The second is school districts because while
not everyone living in metropolitan areas receives the same kind of special service district benefits, they
all receive education services.  Polycentrists would associate more single-purpose districts with income
growth but centrists would not.  After Foster (1993), we create a variable for special service district
dominance which is defined as the ratio of special-purpose (excluding schools) to general-purpose
governments (counties, municipalities, townships).  Our variable for school districts is simply the number
of districts per one million population.  For reasons advanced by Foster (1993) and theorized by
McAndrews and Voith (1993), we expect that income growth will be negatively associated with both
forms of special districts; this is consistent with the centrist perspective.
Representative democracy is founded on the principle that it is the public that elects officials to manage
the affairs of government.  To polycentrists, the more elected officials the more responsive government
is to public needs.  This would be translated into delivering goods and services tailored to citizens' tastes,
preferences, and willingness-to -pay.  To centrists, few elected officials raises the level of public scrutiny
and enhances accountability.  There are two kinds of elected officials, however; those elected to manage
general purpose governments such as cities, counties, and townships, and those elected to manage special
service districts (including school districts).  We create a variable for both kinds of elected officials that
is defined as elected officials per one million population.  Consistent with the centrist view, a negative
association is expected between general purpose and special service elected official density and income
growth for reasons implied by Foster (1993) and McAndrews and Voith (1993).
Regional governance factor.  Forms of regional governance include: city-county consolidation; single-
county, two-tiered federations of government; region-wide special purpose districts that influence growth
substantially (which we limit to regional water and wastewater districts); and regional multipurpose
districts (such as Minneapolis-St. Paul, Portland, and Seattle).
Although some cities extend across county boundaries and some special purpose districts extend across
metropolitan areas (such as park, zoo, and port districts), truly regional forms of governance are by design
intended to influence growth throughout the regions.  City-county consolidations merge central cities with
mostly unincorporated county populations.  To centrists, the effect on income growth should be the same
as for central cities' ability to annex territory commensurate with growth -- being positive.
More problematic are single-county, two-tiered federations of government wherein a countywide entity
establishes the framework for decision-making that is implemented by subordinate local governments
(such as Metropolitan Dade County, Florida [Miami]).  These arrangements suffer from not being truly
regional in scope and not really consolidations of services.  Polycentrists would view them as inefficient
because they add one level of decision-making without necessarily improving accountability while centrists
would worry that more, not fewer, people are involved in making decisions affecting any given service.
Based on our interpretations of both schools of thought, we expect a negative association between single-
county, two-tiered governments and income growth.
To polycentrists, centrists, and regionalists alike, regional single-purpose districts based on the economies
of scale associated with large-scale infrastructure provision should be associated positively with income
growth.  Water and wastewater systems are known well for their scale economies which lead to efficient
delivery typically over large areas and to large numbers of customers.  The presence of such districts
should be associated positively with income growth.
More debatable is the role of regional multiple-purpose governments.  Such arrangements would appear
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1. Behind, in order, Los Angeles, New York, Chicago, San Francisco, Philadelphia, Washington,
Dallas-Fort Worth, and Houston.
2. Nationwide Personal Transportation Survey 1995, Washington, DC: US Department of Transportation.
to be anathema to polycentrists because they threaten to frustrate the efficiencies associated with
competition among local governments, and because they reduce responsiveness to local needs. To
centrists and regionalists, however, such forms of governance allow issues affecting the region to be raised
and addressed at a regional level.  Following McAndrews and Voith (1993) and consistent with the
regionalist view,  we expect a positive association between income growth and the presence of multi-
jurisdictional, multi-purpose regional governments.
Empirical Results.  The following relationships between metropolitan governance structures and change
in personal per capita income were found:
< The ratio of central city dominance is associated negatively with income growth but central
city elasticity is positively associated.  It would seem that Rusk's elasticity argument is
supported.
< As unincorporated population rises in share of metropolitan population income growth lags.
< As suburban municipality size increases, income growth increases.
< As the percent of special districts to all general purpose governments increase, and as the total
number of elected officials per million population rises, income growth lags.
< City-county consolidation does not lead necessarily to improvement in income.
< Multi-jurisdictional, regional utility service and regional governments are positively associated
with income change.
Further research is needed to refine the statistical relationships between metropolitan governance
arrangements and metropolitan economic development.  Nonetheless, these results should stimulate
metropolitan area leaders to take stock of how current governance structures impede and stimulate
economic development at the metropolitan scale.
ENDNOTES TO APPENDIX D
1. For example, San Francisco lost population even though it added housing units in part because
it has been unable to expand its corporate boundaries more than a century.  Similar fates have
befallen many central cities in every corner of the continent.
2. Oklahoma City, with more than 1,500 square miles of land, annexed much of that land before
1980 and continues to have hundreds of square miles of undeveloped land.  Other examples
include Kansas City, Missouri, and Denver, Colorado.  Most consolidated city-county
governments also enjoy this advantage.
3. The central cities of Texas enjoy flexible annexation laws allowing them quite literally to capture
each successive ring of development outward.  Austin, Houston, and San Antonio have been
especially aggressive.
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Case Study of Transit Use in Atlanta's Affluent Northern Tier," Transportation Research Record, 1571:
142-150 (1997).
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12. In 1990, Congress passed the latest in a series of Clean Air Act Amendments (CAAA).  Unlike previous
CAAAs, air pollution from transportation was singled out for special consideration.  This is
because Congress was prompted by increasing numbers of people in the United States living in
"nonattainment" areas for one or more pollutants for which National Ambient Air Quality
Standards (NAAQS) are established.  Indeed, despite improving technology and locally-driven
efforts to reduce air pollution, a combination of factors still prevents many areas in the U.S. from
attaining the NAAQS. EPA estimates that up to about 100 million Americans live in ozone non-
attainment areas.  (Adapted from EPA National Air Quality and Emissions Trends Report).  Six
"criteria pollutants" are addressed in the CAAA of 1990 that relate to transportation:
< Ground level ozone (SMOG precursors such as volatile organic compounds (VOCs) and
oxides of nitrogen (NOx);
< Carbon monoxide;
< Particulate matter less than 10 microns (PM-10);
< Nitrogen dioxide;
< Sulfur dioxide; and
< Lead.
The Atlanta region fails only in attaining ozone standards.  The CAAA establishes five levels of
nonattainment for ozone: extreme, severe, serious, moderate, and marginal.  About 100
metropolitan areas were identified in 1990 as being in one of those nonattainment categories.  As
one would expect, the Los Angeles basin is the only area in the "extreme" category and it has until
2010 to comply with its air quality budget.  Atlanta is placed in the middle or "serious" category
and has until 1999 to be in compliance with the CAAA.  Unfortunately, the Atlanta region is not
likely to meet its budget.
13. The State Implementation Plan requires that ARC's transportation plans and programs will not
(1) cause any new violations of National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS); (2) cause any
worsening of existing violations; and (3) delay the region's effort to attain NAAQS in a timely
manner.
14. The Tennessee River basin enters small sections of the North Georgia mountains.
15. See James E. Kundell, Georgia's Water Resources, in Georgia Water Management Campaign, undated
(circa 1998), Atlanta.
16. Atlanta Journal-Constitution October 4, 1998, H-1, 5-7.
17. There is another regional water resource issue: the proliferation of septic systems.  More than one
million people in the Atlanta commuting shed live in homes served by onsite wastewater
treatment systems, otherwise known as "septic systems" (based on the American Housing Survey,
Washington, DC: US Department of Housing and Urban Development, 1996).  Septic systems
are a time bomb waiting to go off, not all at once but in small explosions everywhere in the
region.  What are the potential consequences?
< All septic systems fail, it is only a matter of time (see, for example, Arthur C. Nelson with
Kenneth J. Dueker, "Exurban Living Through Improved Water and Wastewater
Technology," Journal of Urban Planning and Development 115(3): 101-113, 1989).  Many systems
fail without owners knowing it, such as when untreated effluent enters the groundwater
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table or leaches into nearby drainage ways that find their way to rivers and streams.  The
result is water pollution affected by cumulative failures that go undetected.
< Septic systems are typically located on parcels ranging from one-half to ten acres (see, for
example, Arthur C. Nelson and Thomas W. Sanchez, "Exurban and Suburban Residents:
A Departure from Traditional Location Theory?" Journal of Housing Research, 8(2): 249-276,
1997). The costs to extend urban facilities and services into areas served by septic systems
is usually prohibitive.  Home owners on septic systems often do want to connect to
sanitary sewer and want someone else to pay connection fees if they do.
< Efficient suburban development in areas served by septic systems is hindered because
developers need sites of ten or more acres to design developments that best meet market
needs.  Areas with half acre to ten acre homesites on septic systems make development
costly and usually haphazard.
18. Atlanta Journal-Constitution July 14, 1997, p. E8.
19. Id. (Atlanta Journal-Constitution July 14, 1997, p. E8.)
20. Id. (Atlanta Journal-Constitution July 14, 1997, p. E8.)
21. Nationwide Personal Transportation Survey 1995, Washington, DC: US Department of Transportation.
22. Bureau of Transportation Statistics, National Transportation Statistics, Washington, DC: US Department
of Transportation (1997): 57-58.
23. Keith R. Ihlanfeldt, Breaking the Concentration of Poverty, Atlanta, GA: Research Atlanta (1998).
24. Id.  (Ihlanfeldt, Breaking the Concentration of Poverty.)
25. Keith R. Ihlanfeldt, "Information on the Spatial Distribution of Job Opportunities Within
Metropolitan Areas," Journal of Urban Economics 41: 218-242 (1997).
26. Information provided by the Atlanta Regional Commission to the author, December 1998.
27. Information provided by the Department of Natural Resources, Division of Environmental
Protection, to the author, October 1998.
28. Correspondence from US Department of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration,
Georgia Division, to Wayne Hill, Chairman, Atlanta Regional Commission, September 10, 1998.
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29. For an extensive review, see Kathryn A. Foster, Governance in Erie County: A Foundation for Understanding,
Buffalo, NY: Institute for Local Governance and Regional Growth (1996).
30. Arthur C. Nelson and Katherine Foster, "Metropolitan Governance Structure and Income,"
Journal of Urban Affairs, 1999 (forthcoming).
31. Census of Government, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Commerce (1994).
32. See Final Report: Metropolitan Atlanta Transportation Initiative, Atlanta, GA: Metropolitan Atlanta Chamber
of Commerce (December 18, 1998).
33. The Official Code of the Georgia Assembly (O.C.G.A) provides in Chapter 50-8 that all counties
and municipalities of the state of Georgia shall prepare comprehensive plans meeting certain
minimum standards and procedures.  The Georgia Department of Community Affairs (DCA) and the
relevant Regional Development Center (RDC) reviews locally prepared plans for consistency with
state requirements.  A key provision of the rules implementing comprehensive planning legislation
reads:
It is the responsibility of local governments in the State of Georgia hereunder to serve the essential public
interests of the state by promoting the establishment, implementation, and performance of coordinated and
comprehensive planning by municipal and county governments. (110-3-2-.03(4), Rules of the
Department of Community Affairs.)
Failure to comply with these provisions results in ineligibility for certain state funds.
34. The Georgia Planning Act as implemented through administrative rules attempts to assure
consistency of land use regulations and decisions based on them with the comprehensive plan,
a key provision of the rules implementing comprehensive planning legislation reads:
. . . the governing body of municipalities and counties shall have the authority and responsibility to:
. . . .
(d) Develop, establish, and implement land use regulations that are consistent with the comprehensive plan.
. . . (110-3-2-.03(4), Rules of the Department of Community Affairs.)
Failure to comply with these provisions may result in ineligibility for certain state funds.
35. The legislation, developed following several months of negotiation between the Association
County Commissioners of Georgia and the Georgia Municipal Association, was the major
recommendation of the Georgia Future Communities Commission appointed by former
Governor Zell Miller.
36. Research Atlanta anticipates engaging in future studies on the role, composition, powers, and
effect of the Georgia Regional Transportation Authority.  Suffice it to say for the present that its
primary sources of influence over local government action are with the money it can use to
reward certain behavior and the potential ability to use tools also found within HB 489 to
withhold state permits and other forms of incentives.
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